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THE ECOLOGY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINADonald C. Clarke*Aug. 29, 2008AbstractThe substantive norms of Chinese corporate governance have been studied extensively inside and outsideChina.  Yet much less attention has been paid to the Chinese institutional environment that determines whether andhow far those norms will be made meaningful.  While complaints about general lack of enforcement are common, lesscommon are analyses that concretely tie institutional capacity to specific enforcement problems.  This article aims to fillthat gap.  It surveys a number of state and non-state channels for the enforcement of corporate governance rules andstandards in China, from markets to regulatory bodies, looking at the specific capacities of each.  It concludes byfinding that while the state for political reasons prefers to leave enforcement to state regulatory bodies, its repression ofcivil society institutions is so severe that even a modest relaxation could have substantial benefits.
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    See R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POLIT.1ECON. 1113, 1130 (1998).    See, e.g., Yi Zhang, Law, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Scandal in an Emerging Economy: Insights2from China (Nov. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=957549; Ming Jian & T. J. Wong,Earnings Management and Tunnelling Through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese CorporateGroups (June 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424888.    See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 712 (1994).3    See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW ch. 6 (2002)4(entitled “The Legislative System: Battling Chaos”).    This is not, of course, to say that the system always produces the desired results.  See, e.g., John C.5Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002).  It isjust to emphasize that the significance of a norm is inseparable from its institutional context.    Different perspectives on this issue can be found in, among many others, NEIL K. KOMESAR,6IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
I.  INTRODUCTIONChinese corporate governance presents many puzzles.  Controlling blocks of stock havehistorically sold at a vast discount, not a premium, to the stock market price.  China gets a perfectscore on a widely used shareholder-rights index,  yet looting seems widespread.   The securities1 2regulator fears that cracking down on abuses will stifle, not stimulate, financial markets. Policymakers view the separation of ownership from control in large corporations not as a problemto be solved but as a solution to be embraced.  The leading proponent of independent directors as adefense against abuses by controlling shareholders is none other than China’s main controllingshareholder, the state.  And underlying it all is a legislative system that observers describe usingterms such as “chronic disorder”  and “chaos.”3 4Something interesting is going on here.  The assumptions and institutions behind corporategovernance in China must be quite different from the assumptions and institutions of corporategovernance in Western economies.  Yet the discussion of Chinese corporate governance—andindeed, a major body of literature on comparative corporate governance—often focuses on thesubstantive rules and seems to assume that the institutional environment within which the rulesoperate is pretty much the same everywhere.  The differences are hardly acknowledged, let alonethoroughly analyzed.Of course, to state that the law cannot be studied in isolation from the institutions by whichit is made and enforced can hardly be considered controversial.  Nobody will get tenure by pointingout that in the United States, for example, both the norms of securities law and the means of theirenforcement are inseparable from the regulatory capacity of the Securities and ExchangeCommission.  American securities law would look very different without the army of private-sectorlawyers and other intermediaries that it relies on to function.5Yet even in a country such as the United States, where the institutional context of legal rulesis well understood at least at an intuitive level by insiders, scholarship can make an importantcontribution to understanding how institutions shape the making and enforcement of legal rules.  6
2(1994); Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 931 (2003);Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); ReinierKraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53(1986); Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 U.C.L.A. L.REV. 781 (2001); and Howell E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of SecuritiesLaws: Resource-Based Evidence (Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000086.    An excellent exception is Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in7China’s Securities Market (June 8, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999698.    The key articles forming the foundation of this literature are R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A.8Shleifer & R.W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) and, perhapsmore importantly, La Porta et al., supra note 1.    See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 250-951 (2007).    See Coffee, supra note 9, at 244, 250-51.10    See Udo C. Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany—On the Fallacy of LLSV (May112005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=728403; Robert Schmidbauer, On the Fallacy of LLSVRevisited—Further Evidence About Shareholder Protection in Austria and the United Kingdom (February 2006),available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913968; Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneityof La Porta et al.’s “Anti-Director Rights Index” Under Consistent Coding 68 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law,Econ. & Bus., Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 7, March 2006), available athttp://tinyurl.com/yuk552.
The Chinese institutional context is by contrast far less well understood and studied, even byinsiders; the payoff to examining it, therefore, is even greater.  And it is not enough just to agree inthe abstract with the proposition that institutions matter; the interesting work lies in actually figuringout which institutions matter, and how much, and why (or why not).While Chinese corporate governance has become an increasingly popular subject of studyboth in China and outside of it, studies emphasizing the role of institutions in making the normsmeaningful are rare.   This article aims to fill that gap—not just by arguing that institutions matter in7the abstract, but by showing how specifically they matter in China, and what would have to changefor the institutions to matter in a different way.  This complexity is of course not unique to China,but is perhaps at least more apparent there.This article also aims to demonstrate, through its case-study approach, the dangers of aprominent branch of comparative corporate governance scholarship—the so-called “LLSV”literature  and its offshoots—that is dedicated to measuring the legal norms of corporate governance8and correlating those measurements to measurements of financial market development andeconomic development more generally.  This literature has been criticized on several grounds: that itfocuses too much on substantive law on the books and ignores enforcement issues;  that when it9does look at enforcement issues, it again looks just at law on the books;  that its understanding of10the law—even just on the books—is often simply wrong or inconsistent;  and that the correlations11
3    See Mark D. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup Success (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ.,12Paper No. 02-009, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=318940.    It has been argued that Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence—although not its statutes—also13contains this didactic element.  See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1997); William T. Allen, Modern Corporate Governance and theErosion of the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law 14 (CLPE Research Paper 06/2008),available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1105591.  An important difference is that Delaware expectscorporate managers to educated through the medium of the corporate bar, whereas the corporatebar in China is not expected to, and does not, play this role.
it finds are spurious.   While one case study cannot demonstrate conclusively that attempts to12measure and compare legal rules across jurisdictions are doomed to failure, it can certainly show thattruly understanding a given jurisdiction’s legal system probably requires more than the alreadyHerculean efforts for which the LLSV literature must be given credit.Part II sets forth this article’s conception of corporate governance and various ways ofmodeling regulatory regimes.  It argues that any model must have the capacity to incorporate choicesnot made in order to understand better the choices that were made.  It then discusses some ideal-typical models that are useful in understanding Chinese institutions.Part III provides background information on Chinese listed companies and their investorsthat is necessary for understanding the sometimes surprising features of Chinese corporategovernance.Part IV, the heart of this article, surveys and discusses in detail several important institutionsfor the implementation of corporate governance rules.  The analysis focuses on the role thatparticular institutions are or might be called on to play, and their capacity for performing asexpected.  In addition to covering institutions such as the stock markets, lawyers and accountants,and the financial press, it looks in detail at the role played by the China Securities RegulatoryCommission and by the courts.  Part V ties the threads of this article together and offers aconclusion. The theme that emerges from this analysis of state and civil-society institutions is that thecorporate governance regime in China relies heavily on the announcement of rules by governmentauthorities and relatively little on institutions for making those rules meaningful.  Lawmakers expectthat regulated parties will read the legal texts and voluntarily obey; if they do not, their ignorance ormoral failings are blamed, not the lack of enforcement institutions.13Still less does the corporate governance regime look to non-governmental institutions for themaking and enforcement of rules and standards.  A major reason for this is simply political: thegovernment does not yet accept the existence of institutions that are both powerful and independentof the state.  Moreover, the official cultures of both Imperial China and China under the plannedeconomy have left their common legacy: it is hard for state officials to accept that civil society mightcome up with a better set of procedures than they could come up with themselves.Yet in relying on the state legal and administrative system to make and enforce norms, thestate is playing a weak card.  The post-Mao Chinese legal system, despite a quarter century ofchange, remains an institution of only modest importance in the polity.  As a result, with state
4    See generally Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency14Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).    Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 740-41 (1997).15    See Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance 2 (Harvard University, John M. Olin Center16for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 488, Aug. 2004), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=612362.    See id. at 4.17    See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World ( Harvard Institute of Economics,18Research Paper No. 1840, Aug. 1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=103130 (“[T]he centralagency problem in large corporations around the world is that or restricting expropriation ofminority shareholders by controlling shareholders[.]”); Roe, supra note 16, at 2-3; see also theliterature summarized in Diane K. Denis & John J. McConnell, International Corporate Governance, 38 J.FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (2003).  For a vivid account of controlling shareholdershenanigans in Russia, see Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: WhatWent Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000).
institutions not working well and civil-society institutions not allowed to work well, many areas ofChinese corporate governance display an astonishing enforcement vacuum.II.  MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCEThis article deals with corporate governance in China’s listed companies.  I use a relativelynarrow concept of corporate governance.  It is concerned with issues of finance and agency cost andhas a policy component: the prevention of the exploitation of those who supply the money by thosewho control it.   This concept centers on the relationship between stockholders, the board of14directors, and senior management, and in effect asks, “[H]ow can financiers be sure that, once theysink their funds [into a firm], they get anything but a worthless piece of paper back from themanager?”15This limited conception of corporate governance has two main agency problems: vertical(the exploitation of stockholders as a whole by management) and horizontal (the exploitation ofminority shareholders by controlling shareholders).  In each case, the controller extracts privatebenefits,  but can do so in different ways, and the means of mitigating such exploitation are16different.  Moreover, mitigating one kind of agency cost may mean increasing the other.  Dispersedshareholding, for example, can lead to high vertical agency costs, because collective-action problemsmake it hard for shareholders to monitor management.  But one solution—concentratedshareholdings—may result in higher horizontal agency costs.17In the United States, the main agency cost problem is vertical; in the rest of the world,however, and especially in transition economies, horizontal costs dominate.   China seems to be no18exception to this pattern.  What is exceptional, however, is the identity of the controlling shareholderthat is engaging in the exploitation: in most cases, it either is or is closely connected to agovernmental entity.Commentators in the field of comparative corporate governance have proposed variousmodels of regulation in general and corporate governance and securities regulation in particular. 
5    See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV.19542 (1990).    Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate20Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1077 (2004).    See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J INT’L L. AND POL. 931 (2003);21see also Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duties in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessonsfrom the Incompleteness of Law Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATELAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 77 (Curtis Milhaupt ed., 2003);Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence fromFinancial Market Regulation (April 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=396141; KatharinaPistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China, 7 AM. L. &ECON. REV. 184 (2005).    See generally KOMESAR, supra note 6.22    See Howell E. Jackson & Stavros Gkantinis, Markets as Regulators: A Survey 27 (John M. Olin Ctr.23for Law, Econ. & Bus., No. 579, Jan. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=960168.  One ofthe authors separately develops the concept of enforcement intensity in Howell E. Jackson, Variationin the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications (John M. Olin Ctr. forLaw, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 521, Aug. 2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/3dgcsn.    Coffee, supra note 9, at 257.24
Paredes posits an essentially binary model in which the choice is between enabling (and possiblyeven trivial ) law à la Delaware and a mandatory regime, “in which a fixed set of typically more19restrictive rules would be imposed on companies, reflecting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach toregulating corporate governance.”20In a series of articles, Pistor and Xu have also proposed a binary model, but along a differentdimension: they present the choice as between ex ante regulation by administrative agencies and expost regulation by courts.   As they show, legal rules necessarily need filling out in many specific21cases, and whether this filling-out power should be allocated to regulatory agencies or to courts is byno means self-evident.  The same applies to enforcement powers; the capacity of differentinstitutions to monitor and enforce will vary with the issue in question, and as Neil Komesar hasshown, the question of relative institutional capacity is critical.22Moreover, a recent survey by Jackson and Gkantinis of real-world models of securitiesregulation leads to the surprising finding that extensive state involvement in rule-making does notnecessarily mean extensive state involvement in rule enforcement.   John Coffee summarizes the23results thus: “[E]nforcement intensity seems inversely related to the intrusiveness of thegovernment’s ex ante involvement in the market.  The closer the central government supervises exante, the less it relies on sanctions and penalties ex post.”24All these ways of modeling a regulatory regime are based on real-world observation.  Whilethis has obvious virtues, one drawback is that it makes it difficult to see foreclosed possibilities andto understand why they were foreclosed.  In understanding China’s institutional choices and where
6    See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 7 (2000).25    See id.26    See Bernard Black & Reinier H. Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L.27REV. 1911 (1996).    See Black et al., supra note 18.28
reform is or is not possible, therefore, we need to keep in mind the options that were not selected aswell as those that were.First, the rules could be made by either or both of the state or market participants (viacontract).  The Pistor-Xu model does not distinguish, for example, between ex post courtenforcement of mandatory state-made rules and ex post court enforcement of private contractualarrangements.Second, the state could choose to enforce either or both of its own rules or the rules madeby market participants (through enforcement of contracts); we must also leave open the possibilitythat the state could, through choice or institutional incapacity, not enforce anyone’s rules.  TheParedes model, however, assumes that whether mandatory rules or default rules are chosen, the statehas the capacity to enforce them.  Enforcement by the state also involves choosing enforcementinstitutions and the degree to which enforcement will be ex ante (for example, by state vetting ofindependent director candidates) or ex post (for example, by punishing directors who approve ofconflict-of-interest transactions that damage the company).If the state monopolizes rule-making power, it must be sure to get the rules right.  Thedemands on a regime that leaves rule-making to the market are lower: participants in the corporateenterprise may contract for the rules of association that they think best for themselves.  But thesecontracts may be quite complex, and not every country will have a court system able to enforcethem.   Thus, we cannot know a priori whether a corporate governance regime should rely on25private contracts, laws enforceable by courts in private litigation, or regulations enforced bygovernment administrative agencies.  It is an empirical question.26Third, to the extent that corporate governance is left to market participants and notmonopolized by the state, one can posit three ideal-typical models—the ownership approach, theshareholder rights approach, and the market monitoring approach—that operate to mitigate agencycosts, understanding that any actual jurisdiction will typically display a mix.  These approaches maystill, of course, require the presence of the state as an enforcer of institutional arrangements; as Blackand Kraakman have acknowledged, even“self-enforcing” corporate governance rules  will still be27ineffective if enforcement institutions are so weak that corporate insiders may ignore them withimpunity.28When there is concentrated ownership and it pays the dominant shareholder to expendresources in monitoring because it will reap all or most of the benefit, the incentives of ownershipitself can be relied on mitigate agency costs.  This kind of monitoring relies neither on minorityshareholder rights nor on market signals to discipline management; the owner is already in chargeand does not need the help of courts, and it can receive from its own analysis the signals that wouldotherwise be transmitted by the market.
7    Except, it must be admitted, in litigation in which corporate value is an issue; here judges have29the last word and are often reluctant simply to accept market valuations.
The ownership approach does not, however, come free.  It cannot avail itself of the benefitsof widely dispersed ownership, so companies too large for any single owner to control cannot usethis governance method.  And to the extent the owner undertakes its own analysis instead of relyingon market signals, it must expend resources instead of free-riding on the activity of others.Finally, while concentrated ownership can mitigate one set of agency costs—vertical,between managers and shareholders as a body—it can exacerbate another set—horizontal, betweendominant shareholders and minority shareholders.  As the former decrease, the latter may increase. Which effect will dominate the other cannot be known a priori.The shareholder rights approach attempts to solve the problems of minority shareholderswho cannot avail themselves of ownership rights; they have neither the rights nor the incentives ofowners.  If minority shareholders get help from the legal system at an acceptable cost, however(including the cost of informing themselves), they can protect their interests and both correct anddeter management misbehavior.Like the ownership approach, however, this approach has its characteristic costs.  As thepower of shareholders to protect their legitimate rights increases, so does their power to pursueillegitimate claims.  A corporation whose shareholders enjoy a generous panoply of rights is aparalyzed corporation.  Investors thus rationally forgo certain rights they might like for themselvesbecause they know that other investors are similarly constrained.  The key is to strike the rightbalance.  Where that balance should be struck will differ across jurisdictions, because the availabilityof substitutes for forgone rights will differ.  If there is a good substitute for minority shareholderrights, then there is little reason to pay the cost of an extensive complement of rights because themarginal benefit thereby purchased will be small.This consideration leads to a third approach to corporate governance: the market monitoringapproach.  A firm operates in a number of markets that impose constraints on its management. Most obviously, for example, the stock market and not management has the final word on theappropriate value of a company’s stock.   When markets are functioning well, monitoring is much29simpler.  If stockholders wish to judge whether the CEO’s salary is excessive, for example, they canlook at salaries in comparable companies.Of course, knowing that a CEO is paid too much is not the same as being able to dosomething about it, so the existence of a managerial labor market is not a complete corporategovernance solution.  But if the stock market shares this knowledge, then the stock price isdiscounted accordingly, and those who buy after this knowledge is incorporated into the stock priceare not harmed by it.  Thus, the small investor can free-ride off the valuation efforts of marketprofessionals, and to the extent that the stock market effectively disciplines managers (and dominantshareholders if management does their bidding), the small investor needs no special protections.
8    1,607 as of June 30, 2007.  English-language statistics are available at the CSRC’s Web site at30http://www.csrc. gov.cn/en/homepage/index_en.jsp.    At the exchange rate prevailing during the twelve years the provision was in effect, 10 million31yuan amounted to about $1.28 million.  During this period, the minimum capitalization required forcompanies of this kind in the OECD countries was far less: about $42,000 in Germany, and inDelaware, of course, nothing at all.    Almost 90 percent of listed companies at the end of 2000 were originally TSOEs, see On Kit32Tam, Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 303, 305 (2002),and a 2003 study concluded that approximately 84% of listed companies were, viewed solely fromthe standpoint of equity ownership and not taking account of informal mechanisms of influence,directly or indirectly under state control, see Guy S. Liu & Pei Sun, Identifying Ultimate ControllingShareholders in Chinese Public Corporations: An Empirical Survey 2 (Royal Institute of International Affairs,Asia Programme Working Paper No. 2, 2003).  This figure is roughly consistent with theconclusions of other analysts.  See CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA:THE STOCK MARKETS AND THEIR ROLE IN CORPORATE REFORM 137 (John Wiley & Sons 2003)(citing 2002 Chinese study).
III.  CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES AND THEIR INVESTORSA.  What They AreThis article is concerned mainly with China’s institutions for corporate governance as theyaffect the over 1,600 companies listed on one of the country’s two stock exchanges in Shanghai andShenzhen.   We must therefore understand something about the companies themselves, because30they are in many ways unlike companies listed on stock exchanges in the West or in otherdeveloping countries.In order to be listed, a firm must have the legal form of a joint stock company (JSC) underthe Company Law.  A JSC must, unless established through the transformation of a traditional state-owned enterprise, have at least five initial promoters and shareholders.  Until the 2005 revisions tothe Company Law, it was required to have registered capital (an initial equity investment that cannotbe withdrawn) of at least ten million yuan (five million yuan following the revisions).   JSCs must31have a board of directors and a board of supervisors (jianshi hui).  The shareholders’ meeting is madethe highest organ of power within the company and has a stronger position relative to directors thanin the United States.  The Company Law nevertheless contemplates a relatively active role for theboard of directors, with an ill-defined supervisory role for the board of supervisors.B.  Where They Come FromAs most listed companies were originally state-owned enterprises in a differentorganizational form,  some background about the traditional state-owned enterprise (TSOE) is32necessary.1.  Introduction to the Traditional State-Owned EnterpriseThe most important form of economic organization in the history of the People’s Republicof China, the TSOE is not simply another name for a corporation such as Air France that happensto be wholly owned by the state.  Instead, it can be viewed as a division within the loosely organized
9    For an overview of these reforms, see generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE33PLAN: CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM 1978-1993 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).    China first passed a Company Law in 1993.  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa [Company34Law of the People's Republic of China], adopted Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994 (hereinafter 1993Company Law].  The 1993 Company Law was substantially amended in 2005.  See Zhonghua RenminGongheguo Gongsi Fa [Company Law of the People's Republic of China], amended Oct. 27, 2005, effectiveJan. 1, 2006 [hereinafter 2005 Company Law].    Indeed, it would be anomalous were it otherwise.  There is a deep-rooted official suspicion of35accumulations of wealth not controlled by the state or its officials, coupled with the suspicion of anyorganized activity not firmly under state leadership.  A government that bans unauthorized fishingclubs and associations for the study of antique furniture and paper-cutting, see ZHONGHUA RENMINGONGHEGUO MINZHENG BU GONGGAO [BULLETIN OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
firm of China, Inc.  As such, it has managers that can move up a hierarchy into progressively morepolitically powerful positions—this is the career track of many of China’s current leaders—but hasnothing that could be characterized as stock or transferable equity interests.TSOEs were not and are not necessarily all owned by the same administrative bodyrepresenting the central state.  Instead, the term can be applied to enterprises controlled by one ormore units of government at or above the county level.  The power of management and controlover output—as well as responsibility for supplying inputs—could thus rest in any of one or severalbodies with divergent interests and goals.  Thus, if we insist on speaking of “state” ownership or“state” control of enterprises, we must conceptualize the state as an entity that is capable of pursuingcontradictory and inconsistent policies.2.  Early Efforts at Reform of the TSOE and the Corporatization PolicyAlthough the diagnosis varies, there is little doubt that TSOEs were viewed by policymakersat the beginning of the era of economic reform as plagued by sloth, inefficiency, and waste.  Thetraditional TSOE was not motivated by profit—a sensible approach, since profits in a plannedeconomy simply reflect the difference between the economically meaningless prices of inputs andoutputs.  But there was little pressure on managers to economize, and their income was unconnectedto firm performance.The government attempted a series of reforms designed to improve TSOE performance,33including delegating more production decisions down to the level of the enterprise, reducing theshare of output that fell under the state plan—thus allowing a certain portion to be sold at marketprices at the manager’s discretion—and introducing a contracting system in which the TSOE wasgiven fixed targets, with the benefits of overfulfillment to go to the managers (and possibly theworkers).These reforms had varying degrees of success, but further reforms were needed.  Ultimately,the policy of corporatization was adopted as the foundation of further reforms, and the CompanyLaw  was passed in the service of those reforms.  As a result, it bears their stamp; the need of non-34state actors for a convenient form in which to conduct business occupied a very low priority in theminds of state policymakers, and corporate governance has traditionally been concerned more withregulating and suppressing than with fostering and nurturing.35
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MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS], No. 41, June 6, 2003, available at http://tinyurl.com/6dp7pu[hereinafter Proscription Notice], is unlikely to welcome the unbridled blossoming of organizationswhose purpose is to make real money.    This can happen because the directors understand that that is the way things are done in the36company in question.  If their signature is later needed on some ratifying document, it would bequixotic to refuse to provide it.    See Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Guanyu Guoyou Qiye Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan37Zhongda Wenti de Jueding [Decision on Several Important Questions in the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises], passed Sept. 22, 1999; Jiang Qiangui, Gongsi Zhili yu Guoyou Qiye Gaige [CorporateGovernance and State-Owned Enterprise Reform], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIESNEWS], June 12, 2001 (remarks of vice chairman of the State Economic and Trade Commission);Ngok Ma et al., Advance and Retreat: The New Two-Pronged Strategy of Enterprise Reform in China, 48PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 52 (2001).
An important legacy of this transformation is that the administrative channels of controlpresent in the TSOE have not disappeared, but often continue to function in the shadows,supplanting the formal channels envisaged in the Company Law.  The board of directors may bebypassed entirely in matters such as appointment of the chief executive officer or other importantdecisions.  Instead, the government agency that controlled the firm before its restructuring will issueinstructions in much the same way after restructuring.36Current policy respecting TSOEs is essentially to abolish the form by converting them intosome form of company governed by the Company Law: (a) a joint stock company (JSC) (gufenyouxian gongsi), the approximate equivalent of the large stock corporation in Western countries, (b) alimited liability company (LLC) (youxian zeren gongsi), intended for a much smaller and more closelyknit group of investors, or (c) a wholly state-owned limited liability company (WSOLLC), a specialtype of LLC that may be wholly owned by a state agency.  This process, which does not necessarilyinvolve privatization—it all depends on who owns the shares in the converted company—is alreadywell under way.The theory driving the corporatization policy is the idea that state assets can be bettermanaged through the use of a different organizational form.  Another important consideration inadopting the corporate form, however, was that it made possible the raising of money in equitymarkets, and indeed it is this opening of ownership interests to the public that has made corporategovernance more than simply a way of thinking about internal state asset management procedures.A final point to note about the corporatization policy is to clarify what it is not: privatizationor state withdrawal from the economy.  The state remains firmly committed to retaining controlover enterprises in several sectors: national security-related industries, natural monopolies, sectorsproviding important goods and services to the public, and important enterprises in pillar industriesand the high-technology sector.Indeed, part of enterprise reform involves a magnification of the scope of direct state controlthrough leverage.   In the traditional economic system, the state (through one or more of its37agencies) was the sole owner of a TSOE and exercised full control over it.  Corporatization, throughthe institution of divisible equity shares, allows non-state investors to contribute to the enterprise
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    As a former senior policymaker recently boasted, with an equity stake of a mere 6%, the state38controls the 94% of “social capital” in the Guangzhou Light Industrial Group, and the enterprise isclassified as “state-controlled.”  See Zhang Jing & Xu Shengru, 196 Jia Zhongyang Qiye Da Zhenghe:Yanchu Kaishi le [Big Reorganization of 196 Central Enterprises: The Performance Has Begun], 21 SHIJI JINGJIBAODAO [21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC REPORT], July 14, 2003.    See 1993 Company Law, supra note 34, art. 135 (stating that additional classes of shares may be39provided for only through State Council rules); 2005 Company Law, supra note 34, art. 132 (same).    For a fuller account of share types, see WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 32, at 71-87.40    See STEPHEN GREEN, DRAFTING THE SECURITIES LAW: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL41PEOPLE’S CONGRESS IN CREATING CHINA’S NEW MARKET ECONOMY 15 (Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, Mar. 2003).    For accounts of the scheme, see Suet Lin Joyce Lee, From Non-Tradable to Tradable Shares: Split42Share Structure Reform in China's Listed Companies, 8 J. COMP. L. STUD. 57 (2008); Wallace Wen-Yeu
without, while they remain in a minority, sharing in control.  The state maintains the same level ofcontrol it had before, but now over a larger pool of assets.38C.  Capital StructureUnder both the original and the revised Company Law, JSCs may have only one class ofshares: common.   It is crucial to understand, however, that there are nevertheless several different39types of common shares, distinguished by rules about their ownership and trading.40One important distinction is that between circulating shares and non-circulating shares. Circulating shares are shares that may be traded freely and publicly on various stock markets.  Non-circulating shares are, like circulating shares, common stock, but they are subject to severe tradingrestrictions.  In particular, they are not tradeable on the markets.  The category of non-circulatingshares was created when SOEs began restructuring into JSCs and offering their stock to the public. It was felt necessary at the time to have an institutional guarantee of continued state domination ofsuch companies in order to avoid the suspicion of creeping privatization.  Therefore, the sharesretained by the state in an IPO, as well as the shares owned by the state in JSCs that had not had anIPO, were generally designated “state shares” (guojia gu) and could be owned only by state organs. Typically, restructuring SOEs were required to have about one third of their shares as stateshares.  Another third would go to the public.  The rest was a second category of non-circulatingshares called “legal person shares” (faren gu).  These may be owned only by organizations with formallegal personality, such as companies.  They would typically go to SOEs that contributed capital tothe restructuring company before the IPO—for example, holding companies, non-bank financialinstitutions, and SOEs with a non-state equity holder.  These shares can also be held by governmentbureaux, leading to some confusion in the distinction between state and legal person shares. Although these shares cannot be traded on the market, they can be traded between legal personswith the agreement of the exchange where the company is listed.41The existence of a large block of non-circulating shares came under increasing criticism overthe years both within China and abroad for its distortionary effects, and after several false starts ascheme was finally devised in 2005 for bringing them on to the market.   By the end of 2006, the42
12
Wang & Jian-Lin Chen, Bargaining for Compensation in the Shadow of Regulatory Giving: The Case of StockTrading Rights Reform in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 298 (2006-07); Andrea Beltratti & BernardoBortolotti, The Nontradable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market (November 2006), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=944412; Gan Peizhong & Meng Gang, Lun Guquan Fenzhi Gaige Fang’anZhong de Toupiao Biaojue Zhidu—Jian Tan Baohu Liutong Gu Xiao Gudong Quanyi de Zhidu Goujian [On theVoting System in the Plan for Reform of the Segregated Equity System—Also on the Construction of the System forProtecting the Rights and Interests of Small Circulating Shareholders] (2005) athttp://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=30456.    See Guo Cheng, Liangyuan Yu & Changwen Ke, Understanding the Chinese Stock Market, 18 J.43CORP. ACCOUNTING & FIN. 13, 19 (Sept./Oct. 2007) (1,301 companies, with only 40 companiesremaining).    As of September 2007, the CSRC’s web site showed the market capitalization of circulating44shares to be just one third the value of total market capitalization (valuing all shares as circulatingshares), indicating that it defines as non-circulating about two thirds of the outstanding shares oflisted companies.    This stylized fact was first established in Xiaonian Xu & Yan Wang, Ownership Structure and45Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies, 10 CHINA ECON. REV. 75, 76 (1999); see also RenHaichi, Ruhe Youhua Woguo Shangsi Gongsi Ziben Jiegou [How to Improve the Capital Structure of China’sListed Companies], SHANGHAI JINRONG XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. SHANGHAI INST. FIN.], No. 2, 2004, at60, 60.    See, e.g., 7000 Wan Gumin Qunian Meihu Junping Kuisun 2045 Yuan [70 Million Stock Investors Lost462045 Yuan Per Person on Average Last Year], BEIJING XIANDAI SHANGBAO [BEIJING MODERN BUS.NEWS], Jan. 5, 2005.
vast majority of listed companies had completed the process of formally reclassifying non-circulatingshares as circulating,  but a large quantity of reclassified shares are still subject to lock-ups and may43not yet be freely sold.44 D.  Who Owns Them?Because of the rules regarding initial distribution of shares, until recently the typicalshareholding pattern in listed companies was about 30% for each of the state, legal persons, anddomestic public shareholders (holders of circulating shares), with 10% going to foreigners andemployee shares.   Although this rough average seems robust over several studies, one study finds45that the standard deviation is large, showing that there are large variations in the formal ownershipmix across firms.Understanding the composition of the owners of circulating shares—in particular, thebalance between individual and institutional shareholders—is difficult.  But it is critical tounderstanding how capital markets might affect corporate governance.The stereotype image of the Chinese stock market—one that I shall argue below ismistaken—is one dominated by small investors.  Until the recent stock market boom, one readfrequently of China having 70 million individual investors —about one in five urban residents46between the ages of 15 and 64.  This fanciful number, based on a confusion between the number of
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    See Woguo Zhen Gumin Buguo Yiqian Wan [True Shareholders in China Not More than Ten Million],47TIANJIN RIBAO [TIANJIN DAILY], Dec. 13, 2001, at 3.    See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 32, at 148.48    For example, in the eighteen months from mid-2004 to the end of 2006, the number of stock49accounts rose from 71.5 million to 78.5 million. In the next six months, the number shot up to 107million.  See CSRC Web site, http://www.csrc.gov.cn.  On a single day—May 28, 2007—investorsopened 385,000 new accounts. See Geoff Dyer, Share Trading Accounts in China Hit 100M, FINANCIALTIMES, May 29, 2007.    See David Barboza, To See a Stock Market Bubble Bursting, Look at Shanghai, NEW YORK TIMES,50Internet edition, April 2, 2008 (citing sources at JPMorgan); Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Poor, Greedy AndPowering China's Stock Market Boom, FORBES, Jan. 16, 2008, available at http://tinyurl.com/59huuv(claiming 136 million investors).    See Arthur Kroeber, China Stock Frenzy, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 2, 2007.51    See GREEN, supra note 41, at 70.52    See id. at 70; Barry Naughton, The Politics of the Chinese Stock Market, CHINA LEADERSHIP53MONITOR, No. 3, 2002, available at http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org.    See GREEN, supra note 41, at 72-73.54
stock accounts and the number of investors, was debunked years ago in both Chinese  and English47writings.  Walter and Howie, on the basis of a variety of data, put the number of actual holders ofshares at five to ten million, and estimate the number of active traders to be from 500,000 to twomillion.   The stock market boom of 2007 brought many more investors into the market,  leading48 49to claims of as many as 150 million investors.   Such claims are unfounded.  Many investors hold50duplicate accounts—one in Shanghai and one in Shenzhen—and some control many more than two. Remarkably, fully two thirds of existing stock accounts hold no stock at all—possibly being held inreserve for market manipulation.51Individuals appear to dominate because individual stock accounts constitute well over 90percent of all accounts and hold roughly 90 percent of circulating shares by value.   But these52numbers are misleading.  Recent research suggests that as much as forty to fifty percent of the valueof circulating shares is controlled by official and unofficial investment funds, often using (legally orillegally) individual accounts;  when one then adds in the value of circulating shares controlled by53other institutions, the amount in the hands of individuals appears to be far less.  In sum, probablyno more than five percent of China’s households are individual investors active in the market, andthey probably hold no more than thirty percent of market capitalization.  By contrast, about twentypercent of United States households hold shares directly, to say nothing of those holding sharesthrough mutual funds, pension funds, and the like.  54Overall and within the non-circulating share block, ownership concentration is high inChinese listed companies.  This is what one would expect in a country such as China with weak
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    See La Porta et al., supra note 25, at 14.55    The study is reported in Guojia Jing Mao Wei Fuzhuren Jiang Qiangui: Zuo Shangshi Gongsi Chengxin56Fuze de Konggu Gudong [SETC Vice Chairman Jiang Qiangui: Be a Sincere and Responsible Listed CompanyControlling Shareholder], JINGJI RIBAO [ECON. DAILY], Jan. 30, 2003.    See, for example, the table in STOYAN TENEV & CHUNLIN ZHANG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE57AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 82(World Bank and International Finance Corporation 2002).    Or “relatively small in scale” in the corresponding article 52 in the new Company Law.58    See, e.g., Xu Yongqian & Li Yulong, Gongsi Zhili yu Gudong Baohu [Corporate Governance and the59Protection of Shareholders] 6 (Paper for 21st Century Commercial Law Forum, Qinghua Univ., Nov. 18,2001) (citing with approval tests developed in U.S. law such as “interest or expectancy,” “line ofbusiness,” and “fairness”).
institutions for investor protection,  but given the overwhelming role played by government policy55over the years in preventing dispersed ownership, there may well be room for less concentratedownership even without improvements in investor protection.In particular, control by a single state shareholder is quite common in Chinese listedcompanies.  A study of corporate governance conducted in 2002 by the CSRC and the StateEconomic and Trade Commission (SETC) found that of 1015 controlling shareholders in the 1175listed companies studied, 77% could be considered state organs (guojia xingzhi), while in 390companies a single state shareholder held over half of the shares.56This feature of listed company ownership structure—the concentration of controllingshareholdings in state agencies and holding companies—makes China an outlier among a number ofcountries,  and of course raises questions about the transplantability of corporate governance57models from those countries.IV.  INSTITUTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINAWhat, then, are the institutions of corporate governance, and how do they interact withparticular types of norms?  In this Part, I shall discuss a number of such institutions both generallyand in their Chinese context.To understand the challenges facing any corporate governance regime in China, it isimportant to understand something about the players, both human and institutional, who have astake in policy or can influence it.  Who is the intended decision-maker or norm enforcer, and is thatperson or institution better suited to the task than any alternative person or institution?A common complaint among Chinese academics and lawyers, for example, is that the rulesof the Company Law are too general and are not usable.  Certainly this is true some of thetime—how, for example, should one begin to interpret “relatively large in scale” in Article 52 of theold Company Law?   But sometimes the expectations of the critics seem unrealistic.  No piece of58legislation can spell everything out; the key is to have an alternative system available to supplementlegislative gaps.  Often the detailed standards they cite with approval come not from the legislationof other countries but from case law, or have been developed through case law.59
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    For reasons of space, I have omitted discussion of a few potentially important institutions60because at present there is less to say about them than about others.  The threat of a hostile takeovercan play a role in disciplining management and reducing agency costs, but hostile takeover attemptsare extremely rare in China.  An active financial press can also play an important role in corporategovernance by providing information to the investing public and by posing the threat of a publicshaming to dishonest or incompetent managers.  And intra-corporate monitoring by independentdirectors or (in China) the board of supervisors (jianshi hui) can at least in theory play some role; Ihave discussed that extensively in another article.  See Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director inChinese Corporate Governance, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L.125 (2006).    See Roe, supra note 16, from the list in which several of the institutions examined here are taken.61    It is a standard claim of the law-and-economics literature that competitive pressures, where they62exist, drive out inefficient structures through a survival-of-the-fittest selection process.  That thismay be true in long-run equilibrium does not, however, make it true that at any given moment noinefficient structures can be observed.  It takes time.  Miwa and Ramseyer, for example, whilesometimes acknowledging that competitive pressures “drive firms toward” a firm-specific optimumnumber of outside directors, elsewhere go much further and assert in effect that all firms are alwaysalready there.  See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Who Appoints Them? What Do They Do? Evidenceon Outside Directors from Japan (Harvard Univ., John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics andBusiness, Discussion Paper No. 374, July 2002), available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=326460 (analogizing a sub-optimal number of outside directorsto $20 bills lying on the sidewalk in order to conclude that all firms in their survey must already havethe optimal number).  This vastly overestimates the flexibility of human institutions.  See alsoRATIONAL CHOICE 26 (Jon Elster ed., N.Y. Univ. Press 1986) (questioning the applicability of the
A further complaint is that even when the rules of the Company Law are clear, regulatedparties do not obey them, or else the forms provided by the law, such as the board of supervisors,remain decoratively on the shelf but do not function as the drafters intended.  Commentators tendto blame the actors for acting in ways that do not conform to the law’s idealized structure.  But thereal fault lies in the law’s failure to provide an enforcement mechanism, in particular one that can beactivated by those who are hurt by non-compliance.  It is pointless from a policymaking perspectivesimply to blame the non-compliant, since the only policy consequence of blame is the hope that theywill have a change of heart and do better in the future.This Part attempts to enrich our understanding of the institutional context for corporategovernance in China by looking at particular mechanisms by which the rules and standards might bemade meaningful.   It concludes with a detailed examination of both the CSRC and the court60system and assesses their potential for playing an important role.A.  The Role of Stock Markets and External Debt in Corporate Finance and Corporate GovernanceSeveral institutions exist that align the interests of managers and shareholders.   If a61corporate governance scheme does not rely on legal sanctions or the good conscience of parties, itcan use markets of various kinds—product markets, capital markets, and labor markets—to pressureparties to act as desired.  These markets impose some degree of discipline on management, but thediscipline is often loose, not tight.  It may take time for selection pressures to act on firms operatingsub-optimally.62
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biological analogy to economic activity on the grounds that the economic environment changesrapidly relative to the speed with which inefficient firms are eliminated from competition, and thattherefore at any given time we are likely to observe efficient and inefficient firms coexisting); MarkGranovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 503(1985) (“The operation of alleged selection pressures is . . . neither an object of study nor even afalsifiable proposition but rather an article of faith.”).    On the pre-reform era banking system, see generally NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA’S63UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION (The Brookings Inst. 1998).    The essence of the soft budget constraint is the notion that the difference between proceeds of64production and costs of production is not a matter of life and death for the firm, and that thisdifference therefore does not act as an effective constraint on firm behavior.  See JANOS KORNAI,ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE 302-14 (1980); Janos Kornai, The Soft Budget Constraint, 39 KYKLOS 3(1986).    The Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Construction Bank of65China, and the Agricultural Bank of China.    The Agricultural Development Bank of China, the China Development Bank, and the66Export-Import Bank of China.
When economic reform began in China in 1979, markets did not discipline managersbecause little economic activity of importance took place on a market basis.  Over time,competition—especially in product markets—has increased.  Nevertheless, a number of companiesremain in protected markets; this gives their management a degree of slack.Two important markets are those for external debt and equity financing.  To understand theChinese corporate governance environment, then, we must understand both.1.  Historical BackgroundIn the pre-reform era it made little sense to talk about equity and debt financing at all, letalone equity and debt markets.  The TSOE of the pre-reform era received all its funding fromgovernment bureaux of various kinds.  There was no financial market in the sense of firms seekingfinancing by offering competitive terms, or suppliers of funds offering financing in the same way. There were banks that performed an intermediation function by collecting the funds of individualdepositors, to be sure, but they allocated them to firms according to government direction, actingessentially as cashiers.63If the firm received money directly from its government administrative superior, the transferwould be characterized as a grant; if the money came from a bank, it would be called a loan.  Buteven if the funds came with the label of “loan”, firms operated under a soft budget constraint  and64were under no particular pressure to repay.  While firms still competed for money, they did so on abureaucratic, not a market basis.This system began to undergo reform in the 1980s, when four major state-owned banks65were established to handle conventional banking.  In the 1990s, so-called “policy banks”  were66created to handle non-market-based lending, while the other banks—including newly authorized
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    Such banks include the Bank of Communications, the Shenzhen Development Bank, China67Everbright Bank, and the China Merchants Bank.    See STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET: EIGHT MYTHS AND SOME REASONS TO BE68OPTIMISTIC 22 (The China Project, Royal Institute of International Affairs and CambridgeUniversity, Feb. 2003).  During the Asian financial crisis, for example, the government ordered thebanks to lend heavily in order to stimulate the economy.    See GREEN, supra note 68, at 22.69    See Chao Gupiao, Panic Attack, CHINA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY, June 2008, at 16; Yelin Zhang,70The Roles of Corporatization and Stock Market Listing in Reforming China’s State Industry, 32 WORLDDEVELOPMENT 2031, 2044 (2004); Sebastian Heilmann, The Chinese Stock Market: Pitfalls of aPolicy-Driven Market, CHINA ANALYSIS, No. 15 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.chinapolitik.de.    Although the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was not formally established until 1991, some trading71took place in the previous year..    See CSRC Web site, http://www.csrc.gov.cn.72
“joint stock” banks  owned by local governments together with other institutional and occasionally67private investors—were supposed to make loans based on commercial criteria.  While these otherbanks may be more profit-oriented than the Big Four, they are still subject to significant politicalinfluence in their functioning (they are typically owned in part by local governments) and have notbeen able to escape the obligation to make “policy loans”.   Partly for this reason, non-performing68loans became a major burden on the banking sector in the 1990s, and by the late 1990s, the systemwas insolvent.69Although the stock markets had been in existence since 1990, it was in 1996 that thegovernment, looking for an alternative to bank lending, turned to them as a way of providing a newsource of financing for the troubled state sector.  This marked the beginning of unequivocal statesupport for stock markets.  It also solidified some key features of the Chinese stock markets: first,that their primary role has been not to allocate capital to the most efficient enterprises, but to raisemoney for restructuring SOEs, and second, that the state has been both regulator and cheerleader,with the specific mission of keeping stock prices up in order to support the financing of SOEs.702.  The Stock Market in Recent Yearsa.  How Important Is It?Given the support China’s stock markets have received from the state, much writing onthem unsurprisingly assumes that they are critical to the Chinese economy.  At least until recently,this assumption has been questionable.China’s two stock markets both began operations in late 1990.   By the end of 2005, they71had grown to the point of having 1,381 listed companies with a circulating share capitalization of1.06 trillion yuan (approximately $132 billion),  or six percent of gross domestic product in that year. 72This put China around twentieth in the world in terms of market capitalization.  Looking at marketcapitalization as a percentage of GDP in 2006, the United States showed 148 percent, while Hong
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    See World Bank, World Development Indicators (various years), available at73http://go.worldbank.org/XML5QSOCR0.  The absolute numbers for market capitalization,sourced from the World Development Indicators, are available in convenient comparative form atthe Nationmaster.com Web site: http://tinyurl.com/5lm45h.    See, e.g., Chong-En Bai et al., Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China (William Davidson74Institute, Working Paper No. 564, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=393440; China toComplete State-Share Reforms This Year, CHINA DAILY, Internet ed., Apr. 24, 2006 (Agence France-Presse report); Written Statement of the Securities Industry Association, in UNITED STATES-CHINAECONOMIC RELATIONS AND CHINA’S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: HEARINGS BEFORE THEHOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108  Cong. (2003), available atthhttp://www.sia.com/testimony/2003/siatestimony10-03.html.    See ZHIWU CHEN & XIONG PENG, THE ILLIQUIDITY DISCOUNT IN CHINA (International Center75for Financial Research, Yale Univ., 2002) (finding that non-circulating shares on average have a70%-80% illiquidity discount when traded on informal markets); WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 32,at 186.  For more extended discussions of how to value listed companies, see GREEN, supra note 41,at 6; WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 32, at 188-89.    See CSRC Web site, at http://www.csrc.gov.cn.  Another useful Web site for Chinese stock76market data is at http://www.hkex.com.hk/csm/highlight.asp?LangCode=en.    As of July 24, 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange index was at 2910; in mid-October 2007, it77peaked at over 6000.  See Yahu Caijing Pindao [Yahoo Finance and Economics Channel], available athttp://finance.cn.yahoo.com/; see also Barboza, supra note 50.
Kong showed 904 percent.  Other transition economies such as the Czech Republic, Poland, andRussia show 34 percent, 44 percent, and 107 percent respectively.   In short, the stock market is not73large by most measures.Why, then, were there at the same time widespread claims that China’s market capitalizationwas about $500 billion,  ranking China ahead of Hong Kong and behind only Japan in Asia?  The74answer is that such claims unrealistically valued non-circulating shares as if they were circulatingshares.  All the available empirical evidence shows that non-circulating shares—historically as muchas two thirds of capital stock—sell at a large discount to circulating shares, sometimes by as much as90 percent.   An economically realistic valuation would therefore be much lower.75In the spring of 2006, however, the market capitalization of Chinese listed companies,however measured, began to rise dramatically.  From the end of March 2006 to the end of May2007, the market capitalization with all shares valued (unrealistically) equally rose from 3.54 trillionyuan (US$468 billion) to 17.8 trillion yuan (US$2.36 trillion).  The market capitalization of circulatingshares rose from 1.23 trillion yuan (US$164 billion) to 5.94 trillion yuan (US$786 billion) in the sameperiod.   This certainly makes Chinese stock markets more important than previously.  At the same76time, however, the market surge evident in mid-2007 now stands revealed as a bubble..   By some77measures, Chinese market capitalization exceeded Japan’s as of late August 2007, a conclusion that
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    See Geoff Dyer, Chinese Stock Market Bigger Than Japan’s, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007.  In the78words of Fraser Howie, a long-time observer of the Chinese market quoted in the story, “All realityhas been suspended in China.”    See Stephen Green, Better Than a Casino: Some Good News from the Frontline of China’s Capital Market79Reforms (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Asia Programme Working Paper No. 6, 2003) (citingsources); see also GREEN, supra note 68, at 29 (table showing comparative data for 1993 through2002); Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China (WhartonFinancial Institutions Center Working Papers Series, No. 02-44, Dec. 23, 2002) 17-19, available atfic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/02/0244.pdf.    See CEIC Data, Premium China Database, available at http://www.ceicdata.com/china.htm. 80Substantial amounts of investment also come from categories of unclear significance labeled“other”.  But the insignificance of the equity amounts is clear.    Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 77 J. FIN.81ECON. 57, 73 (2005).    Consider, for example, the case of Si Dansu, a retiree quoted in a recent news article as saying82that she had invested all her her savings ten years ago and lost them in the recent downturn in thestock market.  See Barboza, supra note 50.  This tale might be true, but certainly it is implausible onits face, because ten years ago the Shanghai Stock Exchange index was at about 1500 to 2000,whereas when the article about her was written, the index was at about 3400.
seems hard to justify.   As of the end of June 2008, China’s circulating share capitalization was $86878billion (about 9.7% of GDP), while its total capitalization, valuing non-circulating shares as if theywere circulating shares, was $2.6 trillion (about 29% of GDP).In terms of funds raised for investment, the stock markets also are not important.  In 2002,the stock market provided only $8.9 billion of corporate finance, while bank loans provided $217.7billion.   But while bank loans account for the lion’s share of external financing, it is important to79realize that external financing as a whole is much less important than one might think.  In 2005,about 40% of fixed asset investment was funded by enterprise “self-owned” funds (probablyretained earnings and possibly including depreciation and amortization amounts), compared with amere 0.05% funded by equity issues.   On the whole, then, “[b]oth the scale and relative importance80(compared with other channels of financing) of China’s external markets are not significant.”81b.  Characteristics of InvestorsUnderstanding who the investors are and how they behave has critical implications forcorporate governance.  First, it helps us understand whether equity markets can in fact serve adisciplining function.  Do they respond to failures of corporate governance?  Second, it helps us toassess the necessity and urgency of measures to help the small investor who, in the popular image ofthe stock market, is getting roughed up by the big boys.  If small investors threw up their hands andleft, would it matter?Current research presents a mixed picture.  The picture of the average investor as a naiveretiree staking his retirement savings is false.   Only 17 percent are over 55, and they tend to play82
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    For a full analysis of the investor community, see GREEN, supra note 41, ch. 4 and WALTER &83HOWIE, supra note 32, ch. 7.    On institutional investors, see HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN84MAINLAND CHINA (Jan. 2004), at http://www.hkex.com.hk/research/rpapers/IIMC.pdf.    See Xu & Wang, supra note 45, at 85.  A more recent study finds a turnover velocity of 509% in852000.  See Eric C. Chang & Sonia M.L. Wong, Political Control and Performance in China’s Listed Firms 25(March 2003), available at http://www.hiebs.hku.hk/working_papers.asp?ID=89.  See also Bei Hu,Exposure to Stocks Unhealthy; Trading Mostly Speculative, S. China Morning Post, Apr. 16, 2002, at B4.    See Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Market: Why Do Emerging Markets Have86Synchronous Stock Price Movement?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000).  For further studies confirming thehigh synchronicity of Chinese stock markets, see Art Durnev, Kan Li, Randall Morck & Bernard YinYeung, Capital Markets and Capital Allocation: Implications for Economies in Transition, 12 ECON. OFTRANSITION 593 (2004) and Merritt Fox, Artyom Durnev, Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Law,Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2003).    See Chang & Wong, supra note 85, at 25.87    See, e.g., Bai et al., supra note 74, at 22 (“[B]etter governed companies in China are highly88regarded in China by investors who are willing to pay a premium for high governance standard.” );Charles J.P. Chen, Shimin Chen & Xijia Su, Is Accounting Information Value-relevant in the EmergingChinese Stock Market?, 10 J. INT’L ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & TAXATION 1 (2001) (investors reactrationally to accounting numbers).
the market as a pastime, like bingo.   Institutional investors, not fickle individuals, play the83dominant role in market movements.   And the trading strategy they adopt is largely speculative: the84average holding period in China is about one to two months, compared with 18 months in theUnited States.   In addition, China’s stock markets have a high degree of synchronicity: one study85found that 80 percent of the stocks listed on the two exchanges moved in the same direction in agiven week.   This degree of synchronicity is the second highest among stock markets in forty86countries; it suggests that stock prices move in response to information about the market in general,not about specific firms.   In other words, Chinese investors rationally worry more about the latest87twists and turns in government policy or other market-level rumors than about corporate results.  Atthe same time, however, a number of studies have found that Chinese investors do respondrationally to corporate-level events.88Inconsistent as some of empirical findings are, it is nevertheless possible to draw a fewtentative conclusions from existing research.  First, the picture of the Chinese stock market as solelyspeculative is probably overstated.   Investors are more concerned with fundamentals andgovernance than observers give them credit for.  Thus, good governance will ultimately be rewarded.Second, while a great deal of speculation does take place on the market, it is driven byinstitutional investors, not individuals.  Therefore, current government policy—which blamesindividuals for speculation and attempts to curb it by encouraging institutional investors who will, itis assumed, take a longer-term perspective—is unlikely to be successful.
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    This is the advice for developing and transition economies generally of Erik Berglöf &89Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition andDeveloping Countries 24-25 (June 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=183708.    See generally Cheryl Gray, Creditors’ Crucial Role in Corporate Governance, 34 FINANCE AND90DEVELOPMENT 29 (1997).  Corporate governance literature typically distinguishes between twomodels: one reliant on equity finance and capital markets, and one reliant on debt finance with banksas major shareholders and creditors.  See, e.g., Mark Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure inGermany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993), Masahiko Aoki, Controlling InsiderControl: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 3 (M. Aoki & H.-K. Kim ed., 1995); Erik Berglöf, Corporate Governancein Transition Economies: The Theory and Its Policy Implications, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 59.    See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM.91ECON. REV. 323 (1986); see generally Lihui Tian & Saul Estrin. Debt Financing, Soft Budget Constraints,and Government Ownership: Evidence from China, 15 ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION 461, 462-63 (2007)(reviewing relevant literature).     See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF92AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
Third, policymakers in the field of corporate governance should not worry so much aboutthe small investor.   He is not a major source of funds, and in any case can be no more than a price89taker.  Contrary to government fears, a market downswing will not bring 70 or 150 million angrycitizens into the street protesting the loss of their life savings.  It would, of course, create massivediscontent among a small elite of the wealthy and powerful, which may be an equally goodexplanation of government fear of a falling market.  But it is not the same thing.3.  BanksCapital structure has implications for oversight: when a corporation has dispersed ownershipand low leverage, managers have a great deal of slack.  Conversely, high debt levels lead to closemonitoring by creditors.  To the extent that creditors’ interests are congruent with those ofshareholders—and they often are—shareholders can free-ride on creditor monitoring.In many countries, banks play an important role in corporate governance.   Unlike small90shareholders, banks have both the ability and the incentive to monitor the financial health of theirdebtors, and may impose loan covenants requiring their consent for certain corporate actions. Indeed, academic research suggests that investment financed with bank debt tends to be moreefficient than investment financed with retained earnings, probably because the former must bejustified to a third party, whereas management’s use of retained earnings is subject to no suchoversight.91Banks may also be sufficiently dubious of a prospective borrower’s financial health to refuseto lend at all, thus hastening the departure of a poorly run or otherwise inefficient company from theeconomy.  And they may themselves be major shareholders, as in Germany or Japan, although notin the United States.92
22
    See Su Dongwei, Corporate Finance and State Enterprise Reform in China 6 (Nov. 18, 2000), available at93http://ssrn.com/abstract=250802 (“If [a] political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans,rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs [state-owned enterprises.]”).  See also Part IV.A supra.    The Chinese accounting system in the pre-reform era was typical for a planned economy: it was94about matching sources to uses to monitor the spending of funds as the funder intended.  It was notabout matching revenues to expenditures to ensure that investments were profitable.  See generallyALLEN HUANG & RONALD MA, ACCOUNTING IN CHINA IN TRANSITION: 1949-2000, at 25-28(2001).  And the design of current accounting rules often owes as much to the need to ensure taxrevenues as to the need to match revenues with expenditures.  See Charles J.P. Chen, Ferdinand A.Gui & Xijia Su, A Comparison of Reported Earnings Under Chinese GAAP vs. IAS: Evidence from theShanghai Stock Exchange, 13 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 91, 102 (1999) (citing CHI-WAN YANG &JILIANG YANG, HANDBOOK OF CHINESE ACCOUNTING (1999)).    See Clement Kong Wing Chow & Michael Ka Yiu Fung, Ownership Structure, Lending Bias, and95Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Shanghai’s Manufacturing Sector, 26 J. COMP. ECON. 301, 303 (1998);Jenny J. Tian & Chung-Ming Lau, Board Composition, Leadership Structure and Performance in ChineseShareholding Companies, 18 ASIA PACIFIC J. OF MGMT. 245, 249 (2001).
Chinese banks, however, have historically had neither the capacity nor the incentive to playthis monitoring role.  As discussed above, the traditional role of banks was that of cashier for thestate.  Even after the reforms of the 1980s, lending decisions were often based on political criteriaand the perceived needs of SOE borrowers, not on the prospect of the loan being repaid from theproceeds of whatever project it was used to fund.93Bankers thus did not have the tools to understand whether a loan was being put to good useor not; that was not a question with which they were intended to concern themselves, and theaccounting system at the time would not have provided an answer.   They were simply to supply the94money when ordered to do so.  Nor did they need to worry about defaults; profit was simply not theobjective and played no significant part in the evaluation of bank executives.Moreover, once profits did become important, it was book profits as reported toadministrative superiors that mattered both to the bankers and to their superiors; thus, banks wereforbidden to write off—i.e., declare a loss on—more than a portion of their non-performing loans. Attempting to put a defaulting debtor into bankruptcy would also have had the effect of forcing thebank to close the books on a bad loan, instead of keeping it on the asset side by lending theborrower enough money to make interest payments.The result of all this is that banks have lacked what might be called a culture of monitoring.  95The very lack of a monitoring culture in banks has shaped corporate law significantly, as the statehas tried to do through corporate law what the banks seem incapable of doing for themselves:
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    Of course, every mature legal system provides a range of protection for corporate creditors; in96the United States, such protection is accomplished largely through state law restrictions on corporatedistributions and state and federal rules on fraudulent transfers.  In China, however, corporate lawprotection is viewed as necessary to save creditors from their own misguided lending decisions—andsuch decisions can be very misguided indeed.  Consider, for example, the case of the man whoreceived a bank loan of 3.4 million yuan for his shell company that had no assets.  Had the bankdone any due diligence—simply to the extent of visiting corporate headquarters—it would havediscovered that there was an overgrown field with a few small buildings at the company’s address. See Wu Jianzhong, Yiqi Xubao Zhuce Ziben, Daikuan Zhapian An de Zhenpo yu Bianxi [The Breaking andAnalysis of a Case of False Reporting of Registered Capital and Fraudulent Borrowing], ZHEJIANG GONGANGAODENG ZHUANKE XUEXIAO XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF THE ZHEJIANG PUBLIC SECURITYCOLLEGE], No. 4, 2001, at 77-79.    On the softness of German and Japanese bank monitoring, see Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 15,97at 773, and the sources cited in La Porta et al., supra note 25, at 17-18.    See the sources cited in Tian & Estrin, supra note 91, at 462-63.98    See Tian & Estrin, supra note 91. 99
protecting their interests as creditors.   In other words, far from enlisting the help of banks in96monitoring corporations, China’s corporate law sees them as passive victims that need protection.Recent scholarship suggests that the monitoring value-added of banks in Germany and Japanis much less than was supposed during the eighties, when German and Japan corporate governancemodels were in vogue.   If German and Japanese banks find it difficult to monitor effectively, it is97easy to see that it is unrealistic to expect Chinese banks to manage.  And because banks are often stillrequired to lend for political reasons, the result is that corporate management has been subject to thediscipline neither of the credit market when seeking a loan nor of lender monitoring after obtainingit. Although banks do not seem to monitor well, it is still possible that debt financing couldimprove corporate governance by reducing free cash flows subject to management’s discretionarycontrol.   Here recent research points in two directions: as in many other studies of corporate98governance, ownership seems to matter.  Listed companies controlled by a government shareholderactually display increased managerial agency costs (in the form of managerial perquisites, over-investment, and corporate expenses) as leverage increases, whereas companies controlled by acommercial shareholder typically do not, or display reduced agency costs.   It may be, therefore,99that as shareholding in Chinese companies progressively shifts to non-government bodies, debtfinancing can be expected to play more of a role than it does today.B.  Ownership StructureLarge shareholders can often be reasonably effective in monitoring corporate managers; ifthey do not abuse their control rights, their efforts redound to the benefit of small shareholders aswell.  Many Chinese commentators, however, bemoan China’s concentrated ownership structure asalmost perverse and unnatural, and see the widely dispersed shareholding on the American model as
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    See, e.g., Ma Gengxin, Wanshan Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Jianshe de Sikao [Some100Thoughts on Perfecting the Construction of the Independent Director System in China’s Listed Companies], 20ZHENG-FA LUNTAN [POLITICAL-LEGAL FORUM], No. 6, 2002, at 61, 62.    See Berglöf & von Thadden, supra note 89, at 4 (observing that the widely held firm is rare in101most countries, including transition economies).    “Concentrated ownership” must be understood here to mean concentrated ownership by state102agencies or legal persons because concentrated ownership by individuals is virtually unknown.      See, e.g., Lü Hui & Wu Xingming, Shangshi Gongsi Guquan Jiegou yu Gongsi Zhili [The Stock103Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance of Listed Companies], JINGJI TIZHI GAIGE [REFORM OF THEECONOMIC SYSTEM], No. 4, 2004, at 88, 89-90 (reviewing various studies); Yu Xiaoming, ZhongguoShangshi Gongsi de Guquan Jiegou yu Gongsi Jixiao [The Shareholding Structure of Chinese Listed Companies andCorporate Results], SHIJIE JINGJI [WORLD ECONOMY], No. 9, 2003, at 50 (finding the best resultswhen the largest shareholder holds between 20% and 50%, and the worst results when holdingsexceed 50%); Jian Chen, Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from ChineseListed Companies, 34 ECONOMICS OF PLANNING 53, 69 (2001); Daqing Qi et al., Shareholding Structureand Corporate Performance of Partially Privatized Firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies, 8 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 587, 594 (2000); Sun Yongxiang & Huang Zuhui, Shangshi Gongsi de Guquan Jiegou yuJixiao [Shareholding Structure and Performance in Listed Companies], JINGJI YANJIU [ECON. RESEARCH],No. 12, 1999, at 23-30; Xu & Wang, supra note 45, at 86-87.    See, e.g., Chen, supra note 103, at 68; Qi et al., supra note 103, at 604-05; Xu Xiaonian, Gongsi Zhili104Jiegou: Zhongguo de Shijian yu Meiguo de Jingyan [The Structure of Corporate Governance: China’s  Practice andAmerica’s Experience] (Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe 2000); Xu & Wang, supra note 45, at 88;Lin Ling & Dong Hong, Faren Zhili Jiegou yu Jingying Jixiao: Lai Zi Gao Keji Shangshi Gongsi de ShizhengFenxi [Legal Person Governance Structure and Operational Results: An Empirical Analysis of High TechnologyListed Companies], in GUO FENG & WANG JIAN, GONGSI FA XIUGAI ZONGHENG TAN [AN ALL-AROUND DISCUSSION OF REFORM OF THE COMPANY LAW] 204 (Falü Chubanshe 2000).
the ideal ownership structure.   Yet the American model is the exception, not the rule,  and in100 101China’s circumstances it is far from clear that dispersed ownership would be a good thing in anycase.  As the shareholder’s ability to exploit the minority increases, so in tandem does its ability tomonitor management to the benefit of all.  Which effect will dominate cannot be known a priori.Several studies of Chinese listed companies have found that in general, performance ispositively correlated with concentrated ownership,  at least to a point, and negatively correlated102with dispersed ownership.   The explanation typically offered is that large shareholders reduce the103free rider problem of small, dispersed shareholders and are thus able to monitor management moreeffectively.  In addition, dispersed ownership is especially costly in a society without the institutionsthat give the minority what little power and influence it might have, such as a well functioning legalsystem and an active financial information industry.While finding that concentrated ownership is generally a good thing among Chinese listedcompanies, the same studies also find that performance is negatively related to the proportion ofstate shares and positively related to the proportion of legal person shares in the total capital stock.  104Thus, it is not simply any large shareholder that will do.  The large shareholder must be an
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    See, e.g., John McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate105Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595 (1990); Karen Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value, 23 J.FIN. ECON. 3 (1989).  But see Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985) (finding no significant correlation betweenownership concentration and profit rates for 511 large corporations).    Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 15, at 759.106    See Xu & Wang, supra note 45, at 91.107    See George Lihui Tian, Government Shareholding and the Value of China’s Modern Firms (University of108Michigan William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 395, April 2001).    See Lin & Dong, supra note 104, at 205.109    See Colin Lixin Xu, Tian Zhu & Yi-Min Lin, Politician Control, Agency Problems and Ownership110Reform: Evidence from China, 13 ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION 1 (2005) (finding that private ownershipper se was insufficient to reduce agency costs, that concentrated private ownership was required, andthat dispersed private ownership led to worse performance in Chinese companies).
institutional shareholder that is separate enough from the state so as not to be counted as a holder ofstate shares.Research on U.S. firms suggests that the relationship between firm performance andownership concentration is an inverted V: as concentration rises, performance rises at first, but thendeclines as concentration rises still further.   The explanation, according to Shleifer and Vishny, is105that “as ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain nearly full control and arewealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared byminority shareholders.”106Yet the opposite pattern, if anything, has been observed in Chinese firms: one study foundthat performance, as measured by the ratio of market value to book value, followed a U-shapedcurve as ownership concentration by legal person shareholders increased.   Indeed, the same107pattern was observed with respect to state shareholding.   Another study found that performance108peaked when the largest shareholder held 30% to 50% of the stock, and was worst when noshareholder held more than 30%.109The standard explanation is that individual investors at first fear expropriation by suchshareholders—that they will use their influence to expropriate—but believe that as their stake rises,the interests of the legal person shareholders will become more congruent with theirs.  In otherwords, a controlling shareholder’s ability to expropriate remains constant whether it owns 51% or91%, but its incentive to do so declines as its financial interest in the corporation increases.This explanation has no less surface plausibility than the one offered by Shleifer and Vishnyfor the opposite effect.  What this suggests is not that the explanations are too glib, but that theinstitutional differences between China and the United States are profound and lessons learned inone country may not be readily applicable to the other.  Until further research is done, perhaps themost that can be safely said is that concentrated ownership by non-state shareholders is probably byand large a good thing that should not be discouraged by the law —there is some evidence that it is110
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    See Qi et al., supra note 103, at 609; Xu & Wang, supra note 45, at 95.  A problem with both of111these studies is that they appear to assume that a given proportion of legal person shareholding ismore concentrated than the same proportion of individual shareholding.  This is probably true as anempirical matter, but it is not a necessary characteristic of legal person ownership.    See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.112549, 595-607 (1984).  But see Coffee, supra note 5 (arguing that reputation is not as effective apolicing mechanism as is commonly assumed).    On the capabilities of the Chinese legal profession, see generally STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A113CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 157 (Stanford University Press 1999); PEERENBOOM,supra note 4, at 343-393.  On the accounting profession, see TENEV & ZHANG, supra note 57, at 120-123.    See generally Brent Irvin, The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China (unpublished manuscript,1142005) (on file with author).    See Barney Jopson, Beijing in Overseas Accountancy Deal, FINANCIAL TIMES (Internet ed.), July 25,1152006 (describing plans for foreign training of Chinese accountants and teachers of accountancy).
valued by the market —and that public shareholders are probably capable of taking the possibility111of dominant-shareholder expropriation into account.C.  Gatekeepers: Lawyers and AccountantsPersons and institutions involved in information distribution and gatekeeping—includinglawyers, accountants, securities analysts, underwriters, and the financial press—play an importantrole in corporate governance in many jurisdictions.  The theory is that because they are repeatplayers whose income depends on reputation, the gains from maintaining that reputation willoutweigh the gains from defecting and cooperating in fraud and mismanagement.  Corporateinsiders, it is thought, have the opposite set of incentives.112To perform their function, all of these must of course be appropriately motivated.  If lawyersand accountants bear no responsibility for their opinions, one cannot expect them to press theircorporate clients to correct a state of affairs that damages shareholders.  Similarly, one cannot expectmuch from the financial press if the rewards for providing accurate information are less than therewards for not doing so.Neither the legal nor the accounting profession in China is yet well equipped to play aneffective gatekeeper role.  The SEC has been able to delegate much of its supervisory burden toboth professions in the United States because they are capable of handling the task.  By contrast,China’s lawyers are few in number and, like its accountants, not trained to handle complex financialmatters.   The law schools do not teach such topics, and the modern legal profession has not yet113accumulated enough experience to enable juniors to learn from seniors on the job.The position of the accounting profession is even worse.   China has few qualified114accountants.   A 2001 study of 32 randomly selected audit reports found “gravely inaccurate115
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    See Bei Hu, Mainland Companies Are Reeling from a Year of Financial Scandals During Which the116Audacity of Corporate Wrongdoers Has Put Their Western Counterparts to Shame, SOUTH CHINA MORNINGPOST, Mar. 26, 2002, at 1.    See Bei Hu, Tough Audit Rules Eased After Outcry from Interest Groups, SOUTH CHINA MORNING117POST, March 2, 2002, at B3; Richard McGregor, Creative Chinese Accounting Creates Work for Andersen,FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at 20.    See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 32, at 156-57.118    See Irvin, supra note 114.119    See State Council, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuce Kuaijishi Tiaoli [People's Republic of China120Regulations on Registered Accountants], issued July 3, 1986, arts. 11, 27.    Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuce Kuaijishi Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Registered121Accountants], adopted Oct. 31, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994, art. 42.
errors” in 23 of them.   So bad did things become that then-Premier Zhu Rongji called for foreign116auditing firms to conduct supplemental audits of all listed firms in China.   And the securities117industry seems almost beyond redemption: a CSRC investigation revealed that in the notoriousmarket manipulation scheme of Lü Liang, 125 securities firms actively assisted him.118Lawyers and accountants cannot be expected to play a gatekeeping role if they bear little orno penalty for failing to do so.  The system in China imposes few such penalties.  While law firmsand accounting firms may occasionally be sanctioned by the CSRC, I know of no lawsuits by misledinvestors against either.  And firms seeking listings continue to use the same group of law andaccounting firms without suffering any apparent penalty in the market.1191.  Accounting Firms as GatekeepersIt is not simply their low level of accounting skills that prevents accounting firms fromperforming a gatekeeping role.  A more important reason is that they simply have no strongincentive to do so.Accountants can be subjected to legal sanctions in three ways: through criminal proceedings,through administrative proceedings, and in private litigation.Civil liability of accounting firms for the general tort of certification of false financialinformation has developed only fitfully in the post-Mao era.  An early set of State Councilregulations from 1986 stated that accounting firms making false or improper certifications ofmatters such as financial statements and capital contributions were liable to administrativepunishments of a warning, a fine, a suspension of business, or dissolution.120Accountant liability was broadened at least in theory in 1994, when the Law on RegisteredAccountants provided that “[w]hen an accounting firm violates the provisions of this Law, causinglosses to the engaging party (weituo ren) or another interested party (qita lihai guanxi ren), it should bearliability for compensation in accordance with law.”   In the modern Chinese legal system, however,121broad language such as this can sometimes make courts reluctant, rather than eager, to read
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    See See Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Kuaiji Shiwusuo Wei Qiye Chuju Xujia Yanzi Zhengming122Ying Ruhe Chuli de Fuhan [Reply Concerning How to Handle Cases in Which an Accounting Firm Issues a FalseCapital Contribution Verification Certificate for an Enterprise], issued April 4, 1996; Supreme People'sCourt, Guanyu Yanzi Danwei Dui Duoge Anjian Zhaiquan Ren Sunshi Ying Ruhe Chengdan Zeren de Pifu[Reply Concerning How a Capital-Verifying Body Should Bear Liability for Creditors' Losses in Multiple Cases],Jan. 13, 1998; Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Kuaiji Shiwusuo Wei Qiye Chuju Xujia Yanzi ZhengmingYing Ruhe Chengdan Zeren Wenti de Pifu [Reply Concerning the Question of How an Accounting Firm that Issuesa False Capital Contribution Verification Certificate Should Bear Liability], issued June 26, 1998, effectiveJuly 1, 1998; Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Jinrong Jigou Wei Qiye Chuju Bushi Huozhe Xujia YanziBaogao Zijin Zhengming Ruhe Chengdan Minshi Zeren Wenti de Pifu [Reply of the Supreme People's Court on theQuestion of How Civil Liability Should Be Borne by Financial Institutions that Issue Inaccurate or False CapitalContribution Verification Certificates or Proofs of Funds], issued Feb. 9, 2002.    See Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Shenli Sheji Kuaiji Shiwusuo Zai Shenji Yewu Huodong Zhong123Minshi Qinquan Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding [Several Rules on the Adjudication of Cases Involving CivilTort Liability Incurred by Accounting Firms in the Course of Business Activities], issued June 11, 2007,effective June 15, 2007.    It is not clear how the report could be said to have been “used” by someone who knew it was124false.    Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations for the Administration of the125Issuance and Trading of Securities], issued April 22, 1993.
expansive plaintiffs' rights into a statute.  The Supreme People’s Court then issued a series ofinstructions to lower courts to accomplish this task.122Most recently, and presumably on the basis of lower-court experience with earlierinterpretations, in 2007 the Supreme People's Court issued yet another interpretation, this timemuch lengthier and more detailed than its predecessors.   This interpretation extended and clarified123the conditions for accountant liability.  First, it broadened liability to cover all inaccurate reports, notsimply false certifications of contributed capital.  Second, it repeated the principle that liability waslimited to the amount falsely certified. Third, it defined the “interested party” of Article 42 of theLaw on Registered Accountants as a party who, reasonably relying on or using an inaccurate report(defined broadly) issued by an accounting firm, engaged in a transaction with the audited firm orengaged in transactions with its stock or bonds and thereby suffered losses.  Fourth, it provided thataccounting firms could avoid liability if they could prove they were not at fault.  Fifth—andremarkably—it provided that the accounting firm could still be liable even when the “interestedparty” had actual knowledge that the report was false and still used it,  although the amount of the124liability could be reduced “in accordance with circumstances” (zhuoqing).Regulations in the field of securities have also targeted false certifications by accountants andothers.  The State Council's 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Administration of the Issuance andTrading of Securities,  a proto-Securities Law, provided for fines and other administrative125punishments for accountants and lawyers, among others, who provided false or misleadingdocuments (Art. 73) and also called clearly for civil liability for damages caused to third parties byviolation of the regulations (Art. 77).  The 1998 Securities Law and its 2004 revision both contain
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    See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [Securities Law of the People's Republic of China], adopted126Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999, arts. 161, 189, 202; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa[Securities Law of the People's Republic of China], as amended Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006, arts.173; 223.The provisions on civil liability are vague and have been, as discussed elsewhere in thispaper, considerably weakened through Supreme People's Court interpretative rulemaking. Nevertheless, in 2002, the Supreme People's Court specified that accountants and lawyers could bemade defendants in civil suits for false disclosures under the Securities Law.  See Supreme People'sCourt, Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding[Several Rules on the Adjudication of Civil Suits for Compensation Brought About by False Disclosures in SecuritiesMarkets], issued Dec. 26, 2002, effective Feb. 1, 2003 (hereinafter False Disclosure Rules).    See 1993 Company Law, supra note 34, art. 219; 2005 Company Law, supra note 34, art. 208.127    This does not, of course, mean that there were only seven such cases.  Chinese cases are not128systematically collected and reported, either officially or unofficially.  See Donald C. Clarke, EmpiricalResearch into the Chinese Judicial System, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHESTO THE RULE OF LAW 166-67 (Erik Jensen & Thomas Heller ed. 2003).  The case sample discussedhere was obtained from news reports and from a systematic search of the case law database ofChinalawinfo.com.    These conclusions are based on the author's analysis of data available at the CSRC's Web site at129www.csrc.gov.cn as of Feb. 23, 2008.  The Web site further shows the following data on sanctions
provisions stating that accountants and other intermediaries (including lawyers) who make false ormisleading representations or certifications in the course of securities issuance or trading shall besubject to specified administrative sanctions, in addition to being civilly liable for damages.   The1261993 Company Law (effective in 1994) and its 2005 revision also contain provisions on auditorliability in certain circumstances.127In summary, then, a civil remedy against accounting firms appears to have been availablesince at least 1994.  Nevertheless, it seems to have been rarely used.  I have found only seven casesin the last ten years in which accounting firms have been found civilly liable for inaccuratecertifications.   All were suits by creditors who had dealt with the debtor firm in reliance on the128inaccurate certification.  In another seven cases, creditors brought suit on the same grounds but lost. In one case, a creditor won a re-trial after the first- and second-instance courts erroneously deniedthe legal basis of its claim.  I found no cases in which buyers or sellers of a firm's securities sued anaccounting firm for certifying inaccurate numbers as contemplated by the Supreme People's Court's2007 interpretation.Whatever its theoretical availability, therefore, the threat of private civil litigation frominvestors does not appear to be a realistic constraint on accounting firms in their work of auditinglisted companies.Administrative sanctions are equally rare, at least in the context of securities markets.  In thefour years from 2004 to 2007, the CSRC issued a total of 160 administrative punishments.  In thoseactions, accountants were fined for certifying misleading financial information four times in 2004,three times in 2005, once in 2006, and three times in 2007.   It may well be that the CSRC has129
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stronger than a warning in earlier years: 1993-1998: one; 1999: two; 2001: one; 2001: two; 2002:three; 2003: three.    See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China],130effective Oct. 1, 1997, art. 229.    The databases are available online at http://www.chinalawinfo.com and131http://www.lawyee.com.    The three cases are that of Lu Lihe and Ding Yong, see Liang Zhuce Kuaijishi Chuju Zhengming132Wenjian Zhongda Shishi Bei Pan Xing [Two Registered Accountants Sentenced for Issuing GravelyInaccurate Certificating Documents], Feb. 26, 2006, available athttp://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=196439 (Basic-Level People's Court, YipingDistrict, Yibin Municipality, Sichuan) (hereinafter Lu Lihe Case), that of Li Junyi, see Di JianfengDeng Xujia Zhuce Ziben An [The Case of Di Jianfeng et al. Involving False Registered Capital],available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?gid=117446692 (Gansu Province,Kang County Basic-Level People's Court, Jan. 27, 2000), and that of the accountants in the YinGuangxia scandal, see Dong Bo [et al.] Tigong Xujia Caikuai Baogao, Chuju Zhengming Wenjian ZhongdaShishi An [The Case of Dong Bo et al. Providing False Financial and Accounting Reports andIssuing Gravely Inaccurate Certificating Documents], available athttp://vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?gid=117508210 (Ningxia Hui AutonomousRegion Yinchuan Municipality Intermediate-Level People's Court, Sept. 3, 2003) (hereinafter DongBo Case).    See Dong Bo Case, supra note 132.133    See, e.g., Hu Shuli, Enrons of China, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 1, 2004, 2004 WLNR13418089331 (Westlaw).    See Lu Lihe Case, supra note 132.  An official at the Sichuan provincial-level court stated that135prosecutions for the crime in question were quite rare nationwide.  See id.
genuinely more pressing matters on which to spend its limited resources, but sanctioning accountingfirms is apparently not a high priority.Finally, criminal proceedings are almost non-existent.  Article 229 of the Criminal Lawpunishes the intentional or grossly negligent provision of false certification of facts by lawyers andaccountants, among others.   Prosecutions, however, are rare.  A search of two major legal130databases  turned up only six cases.  A search of news sources turned up one more recent case.  In131this seven-case sample, three cases involved corporate insiders, and in one the defendant accountantwas acquitted.  Only three cases represent classic examples of liability for accountants for failing intheir duty as gatekeepers.   One of those  stemmed from the Yin Guangxia case, a well-known132 133corporate scandal comparable to Worldcom or Enron.   Another was reported to be the first ever134such case in Sichuan province.135
31
    See the provisions of the Securities Law cited in note 126 supra.136    Supra note 125.137    Jinzhi Zhengquan Qizha Xingwei Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures Prohibiting Acts of Securities138Fraud], issued Sept. 12, 1993, abolished as redundant Jan. 15, 2008.    See False Disclosure Rules, supra note 126.139    See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong140yu Geshi Zhunze Di Liu Hao (Falü Yijian Shu de Neirong yu Geshi) [Standards for the Content and Format ofInformation Disclosure by Companies Publicly Issuing Shares (Content and Format of Legal Opinion)], issued July1, 1999, art. 4.  Particularly in view of the reluctance of Chinese courts to hear shareholder suits, thisis less than an unambiguous grant of a private right of action to shareholders against lawyers.  It isunclear whether the CSRC, with less legal status than a ministry, can actually create civil liability.
2.  Law Firms as GatekeepersLike accountants, lawyers issue opinions in the context of securities offerings that must passmuster with the CSRC and on which investors are expected to rely.  Also like accountants, lawyersface a low probability of sanctions for issuing irresponsible opinions on which investors rely to theirdetriment.Some of the regulations already canvassed that cover misleading statements and certificationsby accountants also cover lawyers in the same way.  The Securities Law, for example, covers lawyersas issuers of legal opinions and possibly as securities market intermediaries,  as did its predecessors136and supplements, the 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Administration of the Issuance andTrading of Securities,  the 1993 Provisional Measures Prohibiting Acts of Securities Fraud.,  and a137 1382002 interpretation of the Securities Law by the Supreme People's Court.   In addition, a 1999139CSRC document on disclosure obligations states that lawyers should bear “appropriate legal liability”if they have not adequately checked the materials on which their legal opinions are based.140Private litigation does not appear to play any role in disciplining lawyers.  I have been unableto find any cases in which lawyers have been held liable for their part in disclosure violations, oreven cases in which a law firm is listed as a defendant.  Nor have I been able to find any criminalcases involving disclosure violations or other aspects of corporate governance.The CSRC has occasionally imposed administrative sanctions on law firms for the part indisclosure violations.  These are summarized in Table 1 below.[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]A few points are worth noting about these sanctioning decisions.  First, the data may beincomplete; some punishment decisions probably do not show up here.  This very absence ofpublicity, however, makes sanctions less effective both as deterrents and in their shaming effect. Second, the disclosure violations in question all seem to have been discovered and corrected beforethe sale of stock to the public.  In one case the CSRC simply felt that the offending firm's legalopinion was too vague; in addition to sending it back for more work, the CSRC imposed apunishment.  Third, the CSRC got considerably tougher in the year 2000, issuing more, and moresevere, punishments.  Finally, the record of law firm punishments simply stops at 2000 for reasons
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    See Peng Bing, Zhengquan Lüshi Xingzheng Zeren de Shizheng Yanjiu [Empirical Research into the141Administrative Liability of Securities Lawyers], FA SHANG YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW AND COMMERCE],no. 6, 2004, at 16, 18.    See Wu Xiaoliang, Zhengquan Fanzui Chengjie Yanjiu [Research into the Punishment of Securities Crimes],142CAIJING, Internet  ed., June 27, 2005 (reporting research of Professor Bai Jianjun of BeijingUniversity Faculty of Law).    State Council, Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Temporary Regulations on the143Administration of Stock Issuance and Trading], issued Apr. 22, 1993 [hereinafter Stock Trading TemporaryRegulations].
that are not clear.  A study published in 2004 stated that as of that date, no punishments had beenimposed for acts that took place after the coming into effect on July 1, 1999 of the Securities Law.  141One reason may be that since 2002, lawyer discipline has largely become the province of localgovernment authorities and not the CSRC.  Thus, disciplining decisions are taking place out ofreadily available public view.  Clearly, further research is necessary.D.  State Institutions for Corporate Governance (I): The Role of the CSRCThe following sections of this article will look at state or quasi-state institutions and theircapacity for making rules about corporate governance and discovering and sanctioning violations. They will also look at the particular types of violations that meet  with sanctions.  It must beremembered, however, that sanctioned violations are only a subset of actual violations.  First, not alldiscovered violations are sanctioned; the sanctioning organization has its priorities, and will devoteresources to certain areas it deems important to the relative neglect of others.  Second, not all  violations are even discovered.  On the basis of a survey of listed companies and securities firms,one scholar concludes that for every sanctioned violation another one to four violations wentundiscovered.142Given the Chinese state’s preference for government over  private solutions, the CSRC is anobvious candidate for an important  role in monitoring and enforcing corporate governance norms. It is therefore worth examining its powers in detail.1.  Regulatory Authoritya.  Regulatory Authority in GeneralThe CSRC has central and local offices that undertake a number of regulatory tasks,although the precise contours of the CSRC’s regulatory authority are controversial..  The firstgeneral regulation in the field of securities—the State Council’s Temporary Regulations on theAdministration of Stock Issuance and Trading,  considered still to be in effect today despite the143existence of the Securities Law—gave the CSC and the CSRC under it the authority to regulate “thesecurities markets” (zhengquan shichang) and provided that CSRC approval (among many others) wasrequired for listing.  The 1999 Securities Law, China’s first comprehensive legislation on the subject,gave the CSRC the power to regulate issuers, securities markets, and market intermediaries, andallowed it to delegate certain regulatory functions to the exchanges, which nevertheless remained
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    See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China],144effective July 1, 1999, superseded Jan. 1, 2006 [hereinafter 1999 Securities Law], art. 10; Securities Law,supra note 146, art. 10.    See Sheng Xuejun, Woguo Zhengquan Jianguan Falü Zhidu Moshi [The Legal System Model of Securities145Regulation in China], XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LAW SCIENCE], No. 3, 2001, at 116, 117; Zhu, supranote 160, at 181.    A person required by the Securities Law to make a tender offer must submit to the CSRC a146report containing various details of its intentions, but need only announce to the public the fact ofits offer.  See 1999 Securities Law, supra note 144, art. 82; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa[Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China], as amended Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006, art. 89[hereinafter Securities Law].    See China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Commission for Restructuring147Economic Systems, Guanyu Zhixing “Dao Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Bibei Tiaokuan de Tongzhi”[Notice on Implementing the “Mandatory Articles of Association for Companies Listing Abroad”], Zheng Wei Fa(1994) No. 21, Aug. 27, 1994 [hereinafter Mandatory Articles].
under its tight control—the CSRC still appoints their leaders, for example.  It confirmed the CSRC’sapproval power over public issuances of stock.144At the core of the CSRC’s authority over companies seeking listing or already listed is itsregulation of their disclosure of information.  Moreover, it has traditionally not been reluctant toreview share offerings for substantive merit as well as for adequacy of disclosure.   Indeed, until the145end of 2005, a public listing was conditional upon the issuer’s showing profits for the threepreceding years.Even disclosure itself is directed at the needs of merit review by a state agency, not atproviding information to the investing public.  The public has no right of access to disclosures madeto the CSRC; instead, the law typically—but not always—provides that disclosures made to theCSRC must also be made in some designated public forum.146b.  Corporate Governance InitiativesBeyond disclosure, the CSRC has interpreted its regulatory authority broadly, extending asfar as attempting to exercise censorship over the financial press.  Because this Article is concernedwith corporate governance issues, it will look more narrowly at the CSRC’s considerable initiatives inthis area—initiatives that have gone well beyond the realm of disclosure regulation.  Over the yearsthe CSRC has issued numerous documents of varying and often uncertain degrees of binding forceover the years.  Although a full list would be otiose, a partial list in chronological order will affordsome idea of the breadth of its regulatory reach.! In 1994, the CSRC issued, jointly with the State Commission on Reform of the EconomicSystem (SCRES), a document (the Mandatory Articles) containing provisions required in thearticles of association of Chinese companies seeking permission to list outside the mainland(including in Hong Kong).147
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    China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guanyu Fabu “Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin” de148Tongzhi [Notice on the Issuance of the “Guidance Articles of Association for Listed Companies”], Zheng Jian(1997) No. 16, Dec. 16, 1997 [hereinafter 1997 Guidance Articles].    See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guanyu Yinfa “Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin149(2006 Nian Xiuding)” de Tongzhi [Notice on the Printing and Distribution of the “Guidance Articles ofAssociation for Listed Companies (2006 Revision)”], Zheng Jian Gong Si Zi (2006) No. 38, Mar. 16, 2006[hereinafter 2006 Guidance Articles].    State Economic and Trade Commission and China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guanyu150Jinyibu Cujin Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Guifan Yunzuo he Shenhua Gaige de Yijian [Opinion on FurtherPromoting the Normalized Operation and Deepened Reform of Companies Listed Abroad], Guo Jing Mao QiGai (1999) No. 230, Mar. 29, 1999 [hereinafter Opinion on Further Reform].    See id., sec. 3.151    China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guanyu Zai Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu de152Zhidao Yijian [Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies],issued Aug. 16, 2001 [hereinafter Independent Director Opinion].  The Opinion and related issues arediscussed thoroughly in Clarke, supra note 60.    China Securities Regulatory Commission, Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [Principles of Corporate153Governance for Listed Companies], art. 21, issued Jan. 7, 2002 hereinafter Corporate Governance Principles].    See Shan Yuqing, Youguan Zhuanjia Zhichu Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Jiegou de Quexian Shi Zhongguo Ziben154Shichang Fazhan Mianlin de Juda Tiaozhan [Relevant Experts Point Out that Shortcomings in the Governance
! In 1997, it took issued what was essentially a domestic counterpart to the 1994 MandatoryArticles, the Guidance Articles of Association for Listed Companies —in effect, a mini-148Company Law.  The Guidance Articles were revised and reissued in 2006.149! In 1999, together with the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), it issued furtherguidelines on corporate governance in companies listed abroad in the Opinion on FurtherPromoting the Normalized Operation and Deepened Reform of Companies ListedAbroad.   Like the 1997 Guidance Articles, the Opinion went deep into the heart of traditional150corporate governance territory, purporting to impose a duty of loyalty and diligence upondirectors.151! In August 2001, it issued its Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an IndependentDirector System in Listed Companies.   Covering all companies listed on Chinese stock152exchanges (but not Chinese companies listed overseas), the Opinion required all listedcompanies to have a one-third independent board by mid-2003 and called for theindependent directors to have various powers.! In a January 2002 notice addressed to listed companies, the CSRC issued its Principles ofCorporate Governance for Listed Companies.   Contemporary commentary stated that the153Principles were based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, as modified byappropriate principles drawn from specific foreign jurisdictions and China’s own particularsituation.154
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Structure of Listed Companies Are a Great Challenge Facing the Development of Capital Markets in China],ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO [CHINA ECONOMIC TIMES], July 9, 2001; Tang Xin, Zhongguo ShangshiGongsi Zhili Huanjing De Xin Fazhan [New Developments in the Governance Environment for Chinese ListedCompanies] (Paper for 21st Century Commercial Law Forum, Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, Nov. 18,2001).    China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guanyu Fabu “Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhong Gu155Gudong Quanyi de Ruogan Guiding” de Tongzhi [Notice on the Issuance of the “Several Provisions on onStrengthening the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders”], Zheng Jian Fa (2004) No. 18, Dec. 7, 2004[hereinafter Public Shareholder Provisions].    Stock Trading Temporary Regulations, supra note 143, art. 8(7).  To my knowledge, no serious156argument has been made in China that the CSRC did not succeed to this grant of authority to theCSC.    See 1999 Securities Law, supra note 144, art. 11.157    See Securities Law, supra note 146, arts. 12, 13.158    See Stock Trading Temporary Regulations, supra note 143, art. 5; 1999 Securities Law, supra note 144,159art. 7; Securities Law, supra note 146, art. 7.
! In December 2004, it issued Several Provisions on Strengthening the Rights and Interests ofPublic Shareholders.   The Provisions contain a number of corporate governance rules aimed155directly at abuses by controlling shareholders that had come to be perceived by the policycommunity (probably correctly) as rampant.  Most significantly, the Provisions containedvoting rules on certain matters that directly contradicted specific rules in the Company Law.The degree of the CSRC’s authority to regulate in the field of pure corporate governance, asit were, is not completely clear.  There are some grounds for its assertion of wide authority.  The1995 Temporary Regulations on Stock Trading included among the conditions for listing “otherconditions stipulated by the Securities Commission” (i.e., the CSC) without indicating any limitationson the CSC’s ability to prescribe conditions, thus apparently giving it carte blanche.   The 1999156Securities Law also allowed the CSRC to require the submission of whatever documents it deemsrelevant, again without any apparent limitation.   The 2005 Securities Law, however, requires State157Council approval of CSRC-imposed conditions, possibly in response to a sense that the CSRC hadbeen going well beyond its traditional mandate.158As far as statutory texts are concerned, therefore, it is difficult to find any specific limitationon the subject matter of the CSRC’s jurisdiction.  The statutes granting regulatory authority to theCSRC do contain language that could—if one wished—be read as imposing at least some broadlimitations: the 1993 Stock Trading Temporary Regulations, the 1999 Securities Law, and the 2005Securities Law all state that the CSRC (or the CSC) has authority to regulate “the securitiesmarkets”.159Some academic commentators have questioned whether the CSRC has authority to makeany rules at all.  They argue that the CSRC is an “institutional unit” (shiye danwei), not a fully-fledgedadministrative department under the State Council authorized by the Constitution to formulate
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    For a fuller discussion of this issue, see SANZHU ZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CHINA 53-16054 (2000).    See Zhou Weixin, Zhongguo Zheng Jian Hui “Zhengquan Shichang Jinru Zhidu Zanxing Guiding” de161Quexian Pingxi [An Critique of the Shortcomings of the CSRC's “Temporary Rules on ProhibitingEntry to the Securities Market”], FAXUE [LEGAL SCIENCE], No. 4, 1998, at 60, 61.    See id. at 62.162    This and the following propositions are not self-evident; unfortunately, there is insufficient163space here to establish them by argument.    See 1999 Securities Law, supra note 144, art. 10; Securities Law, supra note 146, art. 10.164    See 1999 Securities Law, supra note 144, art. 167; Securities Law, supra note 146, art. 179.165    Mandatory Articles, supra note 147.166
regulations within its sphere of competence.   It exercises delegated power, and thus can only apply160rules, not make them.   Still less, they argue, can it make rules providing for the imposition of161punishments such as banning.162Ultimately, efforts to undertake a legal analysis of the CSRC’s powers arguably miss thepoint by assuming that such an analysis is meaningful in the Chinese legal system.  Chineseadministrative agencies simply do not act according to a model of legally defined subject mattercompetence.   The CSRC has such power as it can successfully assert.  The main limitations on its163authority are probably better understood as political, not legal.2.  Enforcement ToolsThe CSRC tries to induce compliance with its wishes with a number of tools of varyingeffectiveness.  Its two key weapons are (a) its power to review applications for public share offeringsand to grant or refuse permission,  and (b) its power to investigate and punish violations of laws164and regulations relating to securities.   Sometimes it threatens to use these powers; other times,165intriguingly, it does not.  Still other times it simply declares that certain acts will not be valid undercertain conditions, but it does not automatically follow that other government agencies in China,particularly courts, will give effect to that declaration if it seems to go beyond the CSRC’s authority.a.  Refusal to Approve Applications for Stock IssuanceStandards for listing can be enforced in a straightforward way: the CSRC can refuse toapprove applications that do not meet such standards, and indeed the exposition of those standardsmay not even need to contain the threat of non-approval.  For example, the 1994 MandatoryArticles  contain no explicit threat of non-approval where a company applying to list shares abroad166submits a non-conforming version of its articles of association; it is perhaps too obvious to requirestating.
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    See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guanyu Guifan Shangshi Gongsi Xingwei Ruogan Wenti167de Tongzhi [Notice on Several Issues in Standardizing the Behavior of Listed Companies], Zheng Jian Shang Zi(1996) No. 7, July  24, 1996, ¶ 7 [hereinafter Listed Company Standards].    See Stock Trading Temporary Regulations, supra note 143, art. 70.168    See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guanyu Yinfa “Zhengquan Shichang Jinru Zanxing169Guiding” de Tongzhi [Notice on the Printing and Distribution of the “Temporary Rules on the Prohibition of Entryinto Securities Markets”], issued Mar. 3, 1997 [hereinafter Market Entry Prohibition 1997].    China Securities Regulatory Commission, Zhengquan Shichang Jinru Guiding [Rules on the Prohibition170of Entry into Securities Markets], issued June 7, 2006 [hereinafter Market Entry Prohibition 2006].
b.  Refusal to Accept Applications for Stock Issuance or Other MattersDistinct from a refusal to approve applications is a refusal to accept them.  In Chinese legaland administrative practice, “acceptance” of an application (or petition, or lawsuit) by agovernmental body is a formal act; the term could be translated “docketing”.  Thus, making anapplication involves more than simply submitting the necessary documents.  It also involves aformal acceptance of the submission by the authority to which the application is made.  Many of theCSRC’s regulatory documents are accompanied by the threat that non-compliance by companies willbe punished by the CSRC’s refusal, for a given time period, to accept applications respecting thevarious matters over which the CSRC has approval power, most notably (but not necessarily) theissuance of stock.c.  FinesThe CSRC’s power to impose fines is set forth in detail in Chapter 11 of the Securities Law,which lists a series of specific offenses based on the rules spelled out elsewhere in the statute forwhich the CSRC may impose a fine.  Because the Securities Law does not specify internal corporategovernance standards, however, it follows that it does not prescribe fines for violations of suchstandards.  Nor does it give the CSRC carte blanche to impose fines whenever the CSRC’s own rulesare violated.  Nevertheless, the CSRC has threatened fines for violation of corporate governancestandards.  In the 1996 Listed Company Standards, for example, non-compliance was stated to bepunishable by fines under the “relevant provisions” of the 1993 Stock Trading Temporary Regulations.  167But it is hard to find any “relevant provisions” in the Regulations justifying fines for the actsprohibited by the Standards.168d.  Banning from the MarketThe sanction of banning from the market was first introduced by the CSRC in 1997 with theTemporary Rules on the Prohibition of Entry into Securities Markets;  a revised version entitled169Rules on the Prohibition of Entry into Securities Markets  appeared in June 2006.  Among other170things, the Temporary Rules and their successor provide that persons can be prohibited, either for alimited time or for life, from serving as senior officer, director, or supervisor in a listed company. Although no punishment is stated for persons who defy the ban, listed companies that employ suchpersons in defiance of the ban are subject to unstated administrative sanctions to be imposed by the
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    See id., art. 17.  The basis upon which the CSRC could have imposed such sanctions is not clear,171given that they are not specified in the document itself.    See id., art. 5.172    See Market Entry Prohibition 1997, supra note 169, art. 4.  Possibly due to a drafting oversight, the173CSRC did not in the Temporary Rules give itself the power to prevent malefactors not already officers,directors, or supervisors from becoming such.  This was corrected in the 2006 Rules.    Market Entry Prohibition 1997, supra note 169, art. 4(7).174    See note 155 supra and accompanying text.175    This explanation of the punitive effect of a reprimand was suggested to me by a CSRC official.176    See Zheng Jian Hui Jianli Zhengquan Shichang Canyu Zhuti de Chengxin Dang’an [CSRC Establishes177Good Faith File System for Securities Market Participants], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], April 23, 2002,at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-04/23/content_368574.htm; see also Zaogao de ChengxinJilu [The Mess of Good Faith Records], IT JINGLI SHIJIE [IT MANAGER’S WORLD], Nov. 20, 2004, at 20.
CSRC.   The CSRC may also refuse to accept their applications for approvals on any matter, and171may direct the exchanges to suspend trading in their stock.   Curiously, these enforcement172mechanisms were all removed from the 2006 successor version of the Temporary Rules.  The onlystated enforcement mechanism in the 2006 Rules is a public announcement of the banning and arecord in the individual’s “good-faith file” (chengxin dang’an) maintained by the CSRC.The Temporary Rules provided a list of offenses;  the list did not, however, specifically173include any related to internal corporate governance, although it did include a catch-all at the end for“serious violations of securities laws, [administrative] regulations, [ministry-level] rules, and relevantCSRC rules.”   Thus, if the CSRC made rules about internal corporate governance, it could under174the Temporary Rules punish their violation with a ban on market entry.  This seems to have been whatthe CSRC had in mind when it promulgated its Several Provisions on Strengthening the Rights andInterests of Public Shareholders.   The Provisions declare that senior management personnel have a175duty of good faith and loyalty, and threaten to ban from the market those who violate it.The sanction of banning received a firmer basis in Article 233 of the Securities Law asrevised in 2005, but it is still not clear how banning would be enforced against a defiant party.e.  Reprimands and Other Soft SanctionsFinally, a few words should be said about reprimands, warnings, and similar sanctions.  Ontheir face, they would seem of doubtful effectiveness, and they do not seem to be feared bycorporate and individual wrongdoers.  To the extent that a corporate officer is in effect a stateofficial—and that will be true in certain companies closely connected to the state—a reprimand orwarning could hurt his or her chances for further promotion within the civil service.   But as176corporate officials become more just like private businesspersons, the effect of such sanctions canbe expected to decrease.In 2002, the CSRC announced the establishment of the “good faith file” system.  177According to then-Vice Chairman Laura Cha, directors, supervisors, and senior officers who
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    See id.178    See Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zhong-Xiao Qiye Ban Shangshi Gongsi179Chengxin Jianshe Zhiyin [Shenzhen Stock Exchange Guidelines for the Establishment of Good Faith in ListedCompanies on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board], June 24, 2004, available athttp://www.szse.cn/Web/Article/2004/12/30/1755343437C6615.aspx.    China Securities Regulatory Commission, Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [Principles of Corporate180Governance for Listed Companies], issued Jan. 7, 2002.    By way of contrast, consider the mechanics of the comply-or-explain approach in other181countries.  In Germany, for example, a governmental commission produced the German CorporateGovernance Code.  The comply-or-explain rule, however, is contained not in the Code, which is notmandatory, but in the Public Corporations Act.  See AKTIENGESSELSCHAFTEN [LAW ON STOCKCORPORATIONS] § 161, translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: GERMANY (rev. ed. 1995);see generally Klaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of Internal
committed violations of “good faith” (chengxin) would, in accordance with listing rules, have theirqualifications to hold their posts “restricted” (xianzhi).  Furthermore, listed companies found guiltyof violations of good faith would find that when the CSRC accepted (shouli) their reports on variousmatters, it would “consider” their good faith record in order to raise the costs of violations.178Following up on the CSRC’s lead, in 2004 the Shenzhen Stock Exchange announced theestablishment of a good-faith file system of its own for small and medium-sized enterprises. According to the governing regulations, violations of good faith by listed companies and theirofficers, directors, and supervisors would be recorded and made public.179Needless to say, this is all very vague, and the CSRC’s jurisdiction to judge and punish theviolation of such a nebulous duty is questionable.  In fact, however, so far as the records of CSRCactions on its Web site shows, as of the end of 2007 the CSRC had not once imposed a punishmentfor what might be called a violation of the duty of good faith per se.  Nor did the record of theShenzhen Stock Exchange as of that date appear very different: every report of a sanction that Iexamined was for a disclosure violation—that is, a violation of the Securities Law—and nothing lesslegally solid.Thus, the “good faith file” system seems to be more about putting a general name to amethod of recording sanctions for violations of statutory duties than about judging and punishing anew kind of duty.f.  “Comply or Explain”The CSRC has occasionally adopted a more flexible “comply or explain” approach to itscorporate governance standards.  This, for example, is the approach taken, at least as a formalmatter, by the 2002 Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies.   Although the180CSRC would probably not wish to label them optional, Article 91 seems to contemplate thatcorporate governance practices may diverge from those called for in the Principles, and requiresdisclosure of the existence of and reasons for such divergence.  Logically, however, if the rest of thePrinciples are not mandatory, it is hard to see how the disclosure requirement itself could bemandatory.181
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Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy § 2.1 (EuropeanCorporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 18/2004, Jan. 2004), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=487944.    See Eric Nowak, Roland Rott & Till G. Mahr, The (Ir)relevance of Disclosure of Compliance with182Corporate Governance Codes—Evidence from the German Stock Market (Swiss Finance Institute ResearchPaper Series, April 27, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=9202010 (finding that firm valueis unaffected by announcements of firms’ compliance behavior); Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply orExplain”: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOV. 486 (2006)(finding that "investors do not value reasoned arguments for non-compliance and prefer to usefinancial performance as a proxy to determine when non-compliance can be excused").    There is no doubt that the CSRC sees as one of its tasks the support of the market:183Not only retail investors, but also many government officials, remain of the view that the proper function ofsecurities markets is to go up: the CSRC has been criticized for causing markets to fall through overenthusiasticenforcement.  Even the CSRC itself is wary of overregulation—not in the sense of making too many rules, but inthe sense of enforcing existing rules—for precisely the same reason. Many in the financial services industry arguethat a certain amount of willful blindness on the part of regulators is necessary, at least at the current stage, forpublic confidence to continue because that confidence is driven more by a continually rising market than byknowledge that corporate governance is sound.Donald C. Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan Whiting, The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development, inCHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375, 420 (Thomas Rawski & Loren Brandt ed.2008); see also sources cited at note 70, supra.  As part of its mission to support markets, forexample, in August 1994 the CSRC imposed a freeze on new stock issues in order to raise stockprices by restricting supply.  See ZHU, supra note 160, at 183.  And in May 2008, the CSRCthreatened to punish mutual fund managers who dumped shares along with other investors during amarket downturn.  See Daniel Ren, Beijing Resorts to Threats to Stop Stocks Slide, SOUTH CHINAMORNING POST, May 31, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 10266925 (Westlaw).
In some jurisdictions, the “comply or explain” approach is used because regulatoryauthorities recognize that what might be a good idea most of the time is not a good idea all of thetime, and that case-by-case judgment by an informed market is superior to a strict rule.  Theeffectiveness of this approach, however, has been questioned.1823.  Summary: What Role Can the CSRC Play in Corporate Governance?In terms of corporate governance, the CSRC’s tasks and powers can be summed up asfollows:! It reviews offering documents for conformity with disclosure requirements and substantivemerit.! It formulates rules and recommendations regarding both disclosure and internal corporategovernance.! It attempts to monitor the implementation of the above rules and recommendations and todiscourage violations.These tasks are in addition to its many other tasks, such as regulating stock exchanges andmarket intermediaries and indeed intervening in the market when it deems it necessary.   In other183
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    Mandatory Articles, supra note 147.184    1997 Guidance Articles, supra note 148.185    It was also addressed to the governments of certain cities that are treated as provinces for186economic planning purposes and hence have provincial status in certain cases.    Independent Director Opinion, supra note 152.187    Thus, I am not counting cases where the norm that was violated—for example, a rule of equal188treatment for all shareholders in the distribution of dividends—is stated both in the articles and inlaw.
words, the CSRC has much to keep it busy, and a key question is whether it can perform its variousmissions effectively.As the above review of documents issued by the CSRC has shown, it is not reluctant to telllisted companies how they should manage their internal affairs.  Yet the review of enforcementactions actually taken by the CSRC, at least insofar as they appear in the public record, suggests thatit actually devotes very few resources to ensuring that such internal corporate governance norms areactually put into practice.A technique the CSRC has often used is to require—or at least to attempt to require—listedcompanies to adopt certain norms as part of their articles of association instead of purporting toenact those norms directly as regulations.  It did so with the Mandatory Articles,  where its authority184to do so was unquestioned, but also with documents of more uncertain legitimacy.Take, for example, the 1997 Guidance Articles.   These were contained in a notice that was185addressed to the securities regulatory offices of local governments at the provincial level.  186Declining to attempt to enforce the implementation of these guidelines itself, the CSRC asked localgovernments to ensure that companies under their jurisdiction amended their articles of associationto reflect the guidelines.  Similarly, in the Independent Director Opinion,  the CSRC called for187independent directors to have various powers, but attempted to realize this goal through havingcompanies write these powers into their articles of association or other internal rules.Many commentators treat such norms as if they were mandatory norms of corporategovernance in China.  In fact, they are twice removed from the level of binding norm.  First,whether companies in fact amend their articles of association in conformity with the CSRC’s wishesis an open question that has not to my knowledge been studied.  Second, even if companies doamend their articles of association, those articles, like any other set of rules, are meaningless withoutan enforcement mechanism.The CSRC does not directly enforce corporate articles of association; the enforcementmechanism, if any, is private litigation in courts—probably on what is essentially a contracttheory—by plaintiffs injured by a failure to follow the rules.  My own research has so far failed touncover a single case in which plaintiffs won a lawsuit for the infringement of rights derived only fromthe articles of association.   If the articles of association of listed companies do in fact contain all188the desired rules, then either they are being followed faithfully or else they are simply not justiciable
42
    See Table 3 at page 59 infra, where I discuss CSRC punishment decisions from a different angle.189    This point is developed in greater detail in GREEN, supra note 41, at 28-29.  My own experience190confirms this.  During a series of meetings I attended in 2005 with persons involved in the draftingof the 2005 Securities Law, the complaint was often heard that the CSRC was unable to clamp downon illegal activity because it lacked various powers under the Securities Law then in effect.  In manycases, however, an examination of the law revealed that the CSRC did indeed have the powers inquestion; the problem was that it was unwilling or unable to use them.    See the interviews and sources cited in Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 7, at fn. 17.191
as a practical matter.  Since the first alternative seems unlikely, it is thus far from clear that theCSRC’s back-door route to the enforcement of corporate governance norms is at all effective.What, then, about the front-door route?  Does the CSRC use its punishment power to backup its corporate governance norms?  Here the answer is clearly no.  From 2002 through 2007, theCSRC issued a total of 211 punishment decisions (chufa jueding).   Of those, 99 were for disclosure189violations involving listed companies or their officers, directors, or supervisors.  None was for aviolation of substantive rules of corporate governance, whether derived from the Company Law orfrom rules issued by the CSRC itself.It may be that enforcement actions are few because the need is small.  But it is more likelyeither that the CSRC is aware that it is on uncertain legal ground and thus prefers to resort toinformal jawboning, or that it simply cannot do everything and has made a policy decision toconcentrate its energies on other matters, such as misappropriation of client funds by securitiescompanies.There is also a third possibility that cannot be overlooked: that the CSRC’s hesitancy aboutstrong enforcement action in the realm of corporate governance is part and parcel of its generalunwillingness to enforce standards in its core competence of securities regulation.  Thisunwillingness stems from its dual mission as market regulator and market promoter for the state.  Ifthe securities markets are not paying good money for issues of SOE stock, then the CSRC is notdoing its job, and if clamping down on abuses would hurt the markets—for example, by obstructingthe flow of funds into the market from illegal sources—then the CSRC may not have the politicalwill to do so.  It is not because the regulatory framework is inadequate.190Whatever the reason for the general lack of enforcement, one conclusion seems clear:corporate governance norms that rely on the CSRC for implementation may not turn out to beterribly meaningful in the Chinese corporate world.E.  State Institutions for Corporate Governance (II): The Stock ExchangesChina has two stock exchanges: one in Shenzhen and one in Shanghai.  I discuss them underthe heading of “state institutions” because they were created by government and operate under eventighter government control than a public utility.  Despite their ostensibly self-regulatory nature, theirleading personnel are directly appointed by the CSRC,  and it is not possible for private citizens to191
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    See generally id. at 4.192    See id.193    See id.194    See id.195    See generally id.196    For example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange has issued rules on training for independent197directors, see Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Peixun Guanli Banfa[Shanghai Stock Exchange Administrative Measures on the Training of Independent Directors inListed Companies], March 23, 2006, available at http://tinyurl.com/6mxk88, and on the conduct ofboard meetings in listed companies, see Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Shangshi Gongsi DongshihuiYishi Shifan Guize [Shanghai Stock Exchange Model Rules on the Conduct of Board of DirectorsMeetings in Listed Companies], May 12, 2006, available at http://tinyurl.com/6mxk88.    Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 7.198
establish any new markets.   Thus, they cannot be studied as a civil-society institution arising as a192market response to some social demand.The stock exchanges have available four sanctioning methods, which are, in ascending orderof seriousness, oral warnings, letters of oversight, criticism notices, and public criticisms.   The193exchanges may also designate individuals as unsuitable to serve as certain officers and directors oflisted companies.194According to the most comprehensive study to date of stock exchange sanctions, each of thetwo exchanges typically issues a few dozen warnings and criticism notices—neither of which ispublic—per year.  In 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued 716 letters of oversight (again, non-public), although in previous years it had never issued more than 153.  Between 2001 and 2006, theShanghai Stock Exchange issued 109 public criticisms against 89 different companies, while theShenzhen Stock Exchange issued 149 public criticisms against 116 different companies.195It is difficult to assess the effect of stock exchange sanctions on corporate governance. Liebman and Milhaupt characterize public criticisms as shaming sanctions, and find that they areeffective.   But it is not clear what rules or standards such sanctions enforce.  The stock exchanges196have promulgated listing rules as well as a variety of other rules and standards—mostly relating todisclosure, but a few relating to what might be called internal corporate governance as well —but197the specific conduct that will result in sanctions, while known internally, is not made public:Exchange officials state that their decision not to make the standards public is due to the fact that the Chinesemarket “is not sophisticated”; officials are concerned that if companies were aware of the specific standards,they might manipulate their disclosure so as to avoid sanctions.198The opacity of the sanctioning standards, as well as the fact that few of the published rulesdeal with internal corporate governance matters, means that at present the stock exchanges cannotbe considered an effective institution for creating or implementing norms of corporate governance.F.  State Institutions for Corporate Governance (III): The Court System
44
    Recently some movement on this issue has become visible.  See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke,199Zhengzhou Court Experiments With System of Precedent, CHINESE LAW PROF BLOG, Oct. 21, 2005, athttp://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2005/10/zhengzhou_court.html; FuWeiwei & Zhang Xuliang, Shilun Woguo Anli Zhidao Zhidu zhi Goujian [A Tentative Discussion of theEstablishment of the Case Guidance System in China], FALÜ SHIYONG [APPLICATION OF LAW] (Journal ofthe National College of Judges), No. 1, 2006, at 16.    But see Colin Hawes, Seeds of Dissent: The Evolution of Published Commercial Law Court Judgments in200Contemporary China, 5 AUSTRALIAN J. ASIAN L. 1 2003) (showing growth in some areas of reasonedopinions).     See Donald C. Clarke,  Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Execution of Civil Judgments,20110 COLUMBIA J. ASIAN L. 1, 41-49 (1996).    As, for example, they must when suing for misleading disclosures.202
1.  IntroductionWhat kind of role can Chinese courts play in a corporate governance regime?  There are anumber of tasks for which courts would seem, based on the experience of other jurisdictions, to belikely candidates.A corporate governance regime will typically mix bright-line rules (for example, shareholdervoting requirements for particular transactions) with broad standards such as good faith orreasonableness.  Neither type of norm, of course, will mean anything unless there is a body than canapply it with skill and reasonable consistency.Courts are generally considered the most appropriate body to enforce broad standards suchas fiduciary duty because they have the tools to understand the factual background of the dispute indetail and because they can develop, whether formally or informally, a kind of jurisprudence basedon actual experience.Whether Chinese courts can do so, however, is questionable.  Chinese legal theory hastraditionally been resolutely against the development of any kind of case law by courts—the pupil inthis case surpassing the teacher, the civil law systems of Europe, in adherence to this dogma.  199Judges in any case are not accustomed to giving reasoned opinions of the kind that would allow thedevelopment of a case law-based jurisprudence.200Second, Chinese courts are subject to the principle of horizontal accountability in thepolitical system: judges owe their positions to local, not central, political authorities.   When this201fact is combined with the principle that a plaintiff must generally sue in the court of the defendant’sdomicile,  local judicial protectionism becomes possible.  If the defendant is a listed corporation,202the odds are that it is largely owned and controlled by the local government where the court sits.  Ifthe defendants are executives of the corporation, they are probably also locally influential people. Because the courts are accountable to local political power, it will be difficult for outside plaintiffs towin when they are opposing that power.But the chief obstacle may simply be the policy question of whether it is wise to give theChinese judiciary, with its low level of education and vulnerability to corruption and political
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    See, e.g., Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons203from China 13 (Nov. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=628065.    As I will show below, this statement is a slight oversimplification.204    Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi205Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding [Several Provisions on the Adjudication of Civil Suits for Damages Arising outof False Representations in Securities Markets], issued Jan. 9, 2003.    See Bai Jianjun, Zheng Jian Hui 60 ge Chufa Jueding de Shizheng Fenxi [An Empirical Analysis of 60206CSRC Punishment Decisions], FAXUE [LEGAL STUDIES], No. 11, 1999, at 55-62.
pressure, an important role to play in the development of Chinese corporate governance norms. There is a cost to be paid in forgoing the use of broad standards, to be sure: bright-line rules areinvariably over- or under-inclusive, and rule out the very quality of judgment for which we look tocourts.  But there is also a cost to be paid in relying for their elaboration on a body incapable ofdoing so competently.Indeed, courts in China have shown themselves unreliable as enforcers even of relativelyclear standards.  As discussed elsewhere, they are simply reluctant to get themselves involved inlitigation relating to large corporations.  Even after the SPC slightly opened the door it hadpreviously closed on shareholder litigation for Securities Law violations, actual judgments againstdefendants have been rare and perhaps non-existent.2032.  The Courts and the CSRCIt is important to understand in detail how CSRC procedures and the court system worktogether in the context of corporate governance-related litigation.The CSRC has authority under the Securities Law to impose punishments for violation of itsprovisions ranging from warnings through fines.  Understanding its use of this authority is vital forunderstanding not only the role of government in corporate governance, but also the role of privatelitigation.  This is because a very significant amount of private litigation based on violations of theSecurities Law cannot take place unless the CSRC or other government agency has issued an officialpunishment.   That condition was imposed in 2003 by the Supreme People’s Court in its Several204Provisions on the Adjudication of Civil Suits for Damages Arising out of False Representations in SecuritiesMarkets.   This document was the third of a series of SPC regulations having the collective effect of205barring courts from accepting any shareholder suits under the Securities Law bringing claims offraud (including, apparently, false or misleading disclosures), insider trading, or market manipulationexcept where certain conditions were met: in particular, that the suit was for misleading disclosureand that there had been a finding to that effect in the form of a criminal conviction or anadministrative punishment imposed by the CSRC or some other government agency.In short, to get in the courthouse, plaintiffs must typically first get a key from the CSRC inthe form of an official punishment for misleading disclosure.  How likely are they to get such a key? The evidence suggests not often.A 1999 Chinese study covering the period from October 1993 to December 1998 showsvery little enforcement action against misleading disclosures.   In that period, the CSRC issued a206
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    See Pistor & Xu, supra note 203, at 33.  There seem to be problems with the Pistor and Xu data207or its interpretation.  They report 51 enforcement actions by all relevant regulatory agencies in 2003,of which only 11 were punishments.  The CSRC’s Web site, however, shows that it issued 40punishments in 2003.  See http://www.csrc.gov.cn (CSRC Web site).  Similarly, Pistor and Xu reporteight punishment decisions by all agencies in 2003, whereas the CSRC’s Web site reports 17 issuedby the CSRC alone.    See Pistor & Xu, supra note 203, at 33.208    The numbers in this column cannot be wholly objective and are based on my own analysis of209the decisions.
total of 60 punishment decisions in the area of securities issuance and trading (not includingfutures).  Most of the cases were for price manipulation, for which under the SPC’s 2003 Provisionsthere is now no private remedy.  Moreover, only 26.7% of the cases were against issuers; 43.3% wereagainst securities firms and 8.3% against other intermediaries.  Fewer than 15% of the punishmentswere issued for misleading disclosure.Pistor and Xu present data from later years showing punishments imposed by the CSRC, theShanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and other administrative agencies; the picture is much thesame (see Table 2).207 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]Under the 2003 SPC Provisions, punishments imposed by the exchanges or for acts other thanmisleading disclosures do not provide a key to the courthouse, and so these numbers will overstateto an unknown degree the potential for private litigation; they represent the maximum number ofviolations for which damages in a court action could be sought.The numbers do not look promising.  In 2003, for example, the number of punishmentactions reported by Pistor and Xu (eleven) was less than one percent of the number of listedcompanies.  According to Pistor and Xu, the sanctions were usually benign, with warnings quitefrequent.   Furthermore, the actions seem to have been mostly against securities firms, not against208listed companies or their officers.Even after the issuance of the SPC’s 2003 Provisions, the number of punishment decisions fordisclosure violations satisfying the conditions of the Provisions remains low.  The following tableshows in the second column formal punishment decisions from 2002 (because such decisions couldhave been used as the basis of a private suit under the 2003 Provisions) through the end of 2007(reported as of Feb. 23, 2008).  The third column shows which of these decisions might, under aliberal interpretation, have satisfied the conditions of the Provisions and enabled a shareholder tobring a lawsuit.209 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]The 2003 SPC Provisions also provide a key to the courthouse where a defendant has beensanctioned by another administrative agency or held criminally liable.  Although precise statistics on
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    See Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 7.210    See id.211    See id.212    See Clarke, supra note 201 (discussing difficulties in enforcing judgments in China); but see Xin213He, Enforcing Commercial Judgment in the Pearl River Delta of China, ___ J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. ___(forthcoming 2008) (finding that, at least in the Pearl River Delta, “the enforcement outcomes arereasonable, the enforcement process is relatively efficient, the problem of local protectionism is notserious, and the plaintiffs’ impressions of the courts have also been quite positive”).    See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 15.1 (1986).  For a skeptical view, see Roberta214Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991)(concluding that shareholder litigation, including derivative litigation, “is a weak, if not ineffective,instrument of corporate governance”).
such cases are not available, knowledgeable plaintiffs' lawyers put the number of such additionalpotential defendants at about twenty.210It is hard to know what kind of standard these numbers should be measured against to makethem meaningful.  Nevertheless, it seems plausible to conclude that the number of courthouse keysbeing distributed by the CSRC (and other government agencies) is small indeed.  According to arecent study, despite the existence of approximately 110 qualifying punishments, only about twentycompanies had been sued during the period the Supreme People's Court lawsuit limitations havebeen in effect.   While one company may have been punished more than once, in which case 110211qualifying punishments do not necessarily imply 110 suit-eligible companies, it seems fair to thinkthat many more than twenty companies could have been sued.  When one recalls that to be suit-eligible means that an authoritative state agency has already made an authoritative finding thatmisleading disclosures were in fact made, the number of companies actually sued seems small.Among the lawsuits that have been filed, a small number have reached the stage of judgmentor settlement; only a few have resulted in judgments for plaintiffs.   Moreover, after getting a212judgment in their favor, plaintiffs often find that enforcing it is another matter entirely.2133.  Shareholder Derivative SuitsAs a final way of understanding the role of courts, this section will examine shareholderderivative suits as a detailed case study of the relationship between institutions and norms ofcorporate governance.Robert Clark has labeled the shareholder derivative suit “one of the most interesting andingenious of accountability mechanisms” for large corporations.   In China, however, doctrinal and214political obstacles have severely limited its usefulness as a device for policing managementmalfeasance.  At the same time, lawsuits essentially derivative in nature have occasionally beenallowed, despite the lack of the clear legal basis generally required by Chinese courts.  Whether thelosses inflicted by unpredictability in corporate law are outweighed by the gains of managementaccountability is not clear.  But the uncertainty surrounding derivative suits has been greatly reducedby recent amendments to the Company Law specifically allowing them in certain circumstances. 
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    For an excellent discussion of the special position of the legal representative, see Fang Liufang,215Guoqi Fading Daibiaoren de Falü Diwei, Quanli he Liyi Chongtu [The Position, Powers, and Conflicts of Interestof the Legal Representative in State Enterprises], BIJIAO FA YANJIU [RESEARCH IN COMP. LAW], No. 3,1999, available at http://www.civillaw.com.cn/weizhang/default.asp?id=9199    See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China],216adopted and effective Apr. 9, 1991, art. 49 (hereinafter Civil Procedure Law); Supreme People's Court,Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Shouli Jingji Jiufen Anjian Zhong Jige Wenti de Fuhan [Reply Letter Concerning SomeIssues in the Acceptance by People's Courts of Economic Dispute Cases], issued Nov. 14, 1990, ¶ 1 (directingcourts to send back for supplementation any complaint not bearing the signature of an enterprise’slegal representative).  Prof. Fang Liufang writes:If the legal representative won’t go along, the legal person [i.e., the company] has no way to initiate orparticipate in litigation; if the legal representative on his own initiative takes part in litigation, there are nogrounds for preventing him from exercising the right to sue on behalf of the company.Fang, supra note 215.    See Jiong Deng, Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China, 46 HARV.217INT'L L.J. 347, 356-68 (2005), and sources cited therein.
Allowing such suits to proceed in one statutorily defined channel may have the effect of stopping upother less well-defined channels and thereby increase predictability.a.  Doctrinal BasesDerivative suits need a special doctrinal basis because the chairman of the board of acompany (or its executive director in the case of a company with no board of directors) occupies aspecial position in Chinese corporate law as essentially the personification of the company: the “legalrepresentative” (fading dabiao ren).   As such, he is more than a mere agent of the company and215cannot be stripped, by board action or otherwise, of his ability to act in its name.  His signature isboth necessary and sufficient for the company to act as a plaintiff in litigation.   Consequently, if216his interests will be hurt by the lawsuit—most obviously, if he is a defendant—he will not agree andit cannot, barring some exception to the normal rule, proceed.(1)  1993 Company LawChina’s first Company Law, adopted in 1993, is generally considered not to have providedfor derivative suits.   The most promising section, Article 111, reads in its entirety as follows:217If the resolutions of a shareholders’ meeting or board of directors violate laws or administrative regulations and[thereby] infringe the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders, the shareholders shall have the right toinstitute proceedings with a people’s court requesting the cessation of such illegal activities and acts ofinfringement.
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    See, e.g., KONG XIANGJUN, MIN SHANG FA REDIAN NANDIAN JI QIANYAN WENTI [HOT,218DIFFICULT, AND CUTTING-EDGE ISSUES IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW] 248 (Renmin FayuanChubanshe 1996), cited in Deng, supra note 217, at 356 (view of senior judge at Supreme People’sCourt).    See, e.g., Deng, supra note 217, at 356-58, and sources cited therein.219    This point is made by Prof. Gu Gongyun in Gu Gongyun, Gongsi Fa Xiuding de Ruogan Jianyi220[Several Suggestions Regarding the Amendment of the Company Law], SHANGSHI GONGSI [LISTEDCOMPANY], No. 5, 2000.    See, for example, Articles 59 to 62 of the 1993 Company Law.221    The term “manager” (jingli) here probably means chief executive officer.  Chinese does not222distinguish between singulars and plurals.    1999 Securities Law, supra note 144.223    Securities Law, supra note 146.224
Some commentators have read this as providing the grounds for a derivative action,  while218others disagree.   From both a textual and a practical standpoint, the skeptics seem to have the219stronger argument; the differences between an Article 111 lawsuit and a true derivative suit are clear. First and most obviously, under Article 111 shareholders sue in their own name, not in the name ofthe company.  Second, only a right to require cessation of the infringing act is clearly stated; a rightto recovery of damages is not.   Third, the only acts that may be complained of are unlawful220resolutions of the shareholders or the board of directors.  This excludes not only lawful resolutionsthat may nevertheless in some way cause actionable damage to the shareholders, but also a vastuniverse of acts and omissions that do not take the form of resolutions: all failures to act as well asactions taken by corporate officers and others without a board or shareholders’ resolution.Other sections of the 1993 Company Law spell out statutory duties of officers and directorsto the company,  and Article 63 states that directors, supervisors, and managers  shall be liable for221 222damages caused to the company by their violation of law, administrative regulations, or thecompany’s articles of association.  But it fails to state that shareholders may enforce this liability onthe company’s behalf if the company fails to do so.  More pertinently, courts entertaining derivativesuits in China have not generally found a basis for them in Article 63.(2)  1999 Securities LawChina’s first Securities Law,  issued and effective in 1999 (since replaced by a substantially223amended version effective from Jan. 1, 2006 ), has been thought by some to support derivative224litigation, but again the claim is weak, especially in view of the failure of courts to support it.  Article42 provides that gains from short-swing (i.e., within a six-month period) trading by a five percentshareholder shall belong to the company and shall be recovered in an action initiated by the board ofdirectors.  It further states that shareholders may request the board to take action if it fails to do so,and that directors responsible for a failure to take action shall be liable for losses thereby caused tothe company.  Once again, however, it fails to spell out that shareholders may step into the shoes ofa recalcitrant board and sue in the name of the company.
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    Corporate Governance Principles, supra note 153.225    The term used here, yaoqiu, can mean request or demand (i.e., a request coupled with a right to226compliance).  Given other examples of the term in Chinese legislation, I believe that here it meansmerely “request” without an associated right to satisfaction.    See, e.g., Xuan Weihua & Li Chen, Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze Ruogan Wenti Pingxi [Comments on227Several Issues Relating to the Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Corporations], SHANGSHI GONGSI[LISTED COMPANY], No. 7, 2002, available athttp://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper87/7526/721417.html.    Chinese courts and other government agencies frequently issue documents labeled yijian;228although this term is customarily translated “opinion”, it means something like a suggestion, andshould not be confused with “opinion” meaning a formal decision issued by a judge to decide a case.    Beijing Higher People's Court, Guanyu Shenli Gongsi Jiufen Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian229[Guidance Opinion on Several Issues Relating to the Adjudication of Corporate Dispute Cases], adopted Feb.  9,2004, issued and effective Feb. 24, 2006.
(3)  Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed CompaniesIn January 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued its Principles ofCorporate Governance for Listed Companies.   Article 4 of the Principles states that in certain225cases of management wrongdoing, “[s]hareholders have the right to request (yaoqiu)  that the226company bring litigation according to law requesting (yaoqiu) compensation.”Although some commentators have stated that the Principles provide a legal basis forderivative suits,  the argument seems weak.  The sentence in question contains no hint of what is227to happen if the company rejects the shareholder’s request to bring litigation.  As Chinese courts areas likely as not to interpret their jurisdiction narrowly in order to avoid nettlesome cases, this lacunais significant.More importantly, however, the Principles simply are not law.  They are a set of standardsthat the CSRC desires listed companies to implement in their articles of association.  Whether theCSRC has the authority to force companies to do so is debated; the fact that it wishes companies todo so, however, suggests that stating the norms in the Principles is not sufficient to make themoperational.(4)  2004 Beijing Higher People’s Court Opinion228In February 2004, the Beijing Higher Court issued its Guidance Opinion on Several IssuesRelating to the Adjudication of Corporate Dispute Cases,  which like the draft Supreme People’s229Court Provisions deals with derivative suits, but which unlike them purports to be effective uponissuance.  Article 8 of the Opinion, in question-and-answer format, states in its entirety:How should the parties be ascertained when a shareholder brings suit on the grounds that the company’s interests have been harmedby the improper behavior of a shareholder or company management personnel?  This type of litigation is the kind where ashareholder represents the company’s interests in bringing suit; the company shareholder may be the plaintiff,while the defendants are the shareholder or company management personnel who engaged in the improper actsand the opposite party in related transactions.  The company should participate in the litigation as a third party.
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    See Gao Fayuan Fuyuanzhang Li Guoguang Biaoshi: Xiao Gudong Gao Da Gudong Fayuan Ying Shouli230[Supreme People’s Court Vice President Li Guoguang Indicates that Courts Should Accept Suits by SmallShareholders Against Large Shareholders], BEIJING YULE XINBAO [BEIJING RECREATION NEWS], Dec.12, 2002, available at http://news.sohu.com/58/64/news204906458.shtml.    See Shouli Gudong Daibiao Susong Wei Bei Shouli [First Shareholder Representative Suit Is not Accepted],231SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI SEC. NEWS], Apr. 22, 2003, available athttp://101.stock888.net/030422/100,101,78015,00.shtml (hereinafter cited as First Shareholder Suit);see also Qian Weiqing, Gongsi Susong—Gongsi Sifa Jiuji Fangshi Xin Lun (6) [Corporate Litigation: A NewDiscussion of Methods of Judicial Remedies for Companies (6)], May 23, 2003, athttp://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=25304.    Another quasi-derivative suit case not discussed here for reasons of space is the Taishan232Company case discussed at Zhang Rulian & Wang Ling, Ben An Gudong Shifou You Quan ChongdangYuangao Daibiao Gongsi Tiqi Susong [Does the Shareholder in This Case Have the Right to Take the Role ofPlaintiff and Bring Suit on Behalf of the Company?], RENMIN FAYUAN WANG [PEOPLE'S COURT NET],May 31, 2004, at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=117915.
As the document is called a “Guidance Opinion”, it is not clear how far the Beijing HigherPeople’s Court (the highest court in Beijing, which has the administrative status of a province)wishes to bind the courts under it.  I believe courts would have remained free to reject such suitshad they wished to do so, thus making derivative claims essentially discretionary.  At the same time,however, the Opinion represents the first unambiguous declaration from a legally authoritative bodythat derivative suits can, at least in some circumstances, be accepted by courts.(5)  Supreme People’s Court PolicyFinally, it is worth mentioning an informal signal from the Supreme People’s Court.  InDecember 2002, a senior Supreme People’s Court judge stated that courts should accept derivativesuits.   These remarks were cited hopefully by one plaintiff; his suit was nevertheless rejected by a230lower court, which informed him that such remarks were “for reference” only and could notconstitute a basis for accepting the suit.231b.  CasesDespite their unpromising doctrinal foundation, derivative suits are not unknown in China. In the following cases, courts considered and occasionally accepted arguments that the shareholderplaintiff should be able, against the wishes of another shareholder that controlled the company’sability to litigate, to sue another party (sometimes that shareholder) for damages inflicted directly onthe company.  It is interesting to note that where the courts accepted the argument, they did notattempt to impose any limiting principle on such arguments; all they seem to have required was aplausible allegation of damage to the company and a refusal by the controlling party to seek recoveryof those damages.232
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    The facts of this case are taken from Deng, supra note 217, at 365 n.108, and Supreme People's233Court, Guanyu Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Duiwai Fasheng Jingji Hetong Jiufen, Kongzhi Heying Qiye deWaifang yu Maifang You Lihai Guanxi, Heying Qiye de Zhongfang Ying Yi Shei de Mingyi Xiang RenminFayuan Qisu Wenti de Fuhan [Reply Letter on the Issue of in Whose Name the Chinese Party to a Chinese-ForeignEquity Joint Venture Should Bring Suit When the Joint Venture Has an Economic Contract Dispute with anExternal Party and the Foreign Party Controlling the Joint Venture Has a Relationship of Interest with the Seller],issued Nov. 4, 1994, available athttp://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/9/9-1-4-01.html (hereinafter SPC Replyon Derivative Suits).    See id.234    See the Wu Fang Zhai case, discussed in Part IV.F.3.b.(4) infra.235    The facts of this case are taken from Deng, supra note 217, at 366-367; it is discussed in236numerous Chinese sources, including Fang, supra note 215.
(1)  Zhangjiagang Fiber Company CaseThe first generally known case of the post-Mao era was a 1993 suit brought in JiangsuProvince by the Zhangjiagang Polyester Fiber Factory (“Factory”).   Factory had joined together233with a Hong Kong company, Jixiong Corporation (“Jixiong”) to form a Chinese-foreign equity jointventure called Zhangjiagang Jixiong Chemical Fiber Company (“JV”) in which Jixiong was thecontrolling party.  JV had then entered into a contract with another Hong Kong company, DaxingEngineering Company (“Daxing”), in which Jixiong had an interest of an unspecified nature.  Whena contract dispute arose, Jixiong refused to cause JV to bring suit against Daxing.  Factory thenbrought suit in a local court in Jiangsu Province seeking to bring suit on behalf of JV.The question of Factory’s standing ultimately went to the Supreme People’s Court, whichresponded that Factoty could indeed exercise the litigation rights of JV, but in this particular wouldnot be able to do so because of a pre-existing arbitration agreement.   Thus, the case did not234actually result in a derivative suit being heard, even though its acceptability in at least some cases wasestablished in principle.  How far the reasoning of the Court’s reply reaches has never been clear;given how the Court chose to entitle it, it could be read as applying narrowly to Chinese-foreignequity joint ventures controlled by a foreign party.  Although it seems to have been cited in asubsequent purely domestic case,  in general courts have been far from interpreting it as an235encouragement, let alone a command, to accept derivative suits.(2)  Shanghai Yanzhong Water Company CasesIn 1996 and 1997, a widely publicized and complex series of lawsuits involving theYanzhong Drinking Water Company tested the appetite of the Shanghai courts for derivativesuits.   Ultimately the plaintiff’s attempt to bring such a suit was rejected.236 The Yanzhong cases pitted a minority (30%) shareholder (Yanzhong), which controlled thechairman of the board, against the majority (60%) shareholder (Zhongtian), which had a majority ofboard seats and controlled the general manager (i.e., the CEO).  Both attempted to cause thecompany to bring a lawsuit that they would control to their own advantage; both such lawsuits weredismissed.  A lawsuit by Zhongtian in its own name against Yanzhong for damages caused to the
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    The facts of this case are taken from Xie Zhihong & Chen Mingtian, Gudong Paisheng Susong Zai237Sikao [Rethinking Shareholder Derivative Suits], FUJIAN ZHENG-FA GUANLI GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO[JOURNAL OF THE FUJIAN POLITICAL-LEGAL ADMINISTRATIVE CADRE INSTITUTE], No. 4, 2001, at24, 24.  One of the authors is an assistant judge in the Fujian Higher People’s Court, where hepresumably ran across this case.    Id. (summarizing court’s reasoning).238    The facts of this case are taken from LUO PEIXIN, GONGSI FA DE HETONG JIESHI [A239CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION OF COMPANY LAW] 335-36 (Beijing Daxue Chubanshe 2004). Further detail can be found at Lu Xiaoping, Dongshichang Zi Tao Yaobao Pei 250 Wan; Zhiyi Wu FangZhai Shijian [Chairman of the Board Compensates 2.5 Million From His Own Wallet; Questions About the WuFang Zhai Case], CAIJING SHIBAO [FINANCE AND ECONOMY TIMES], July 27, 2001, available athttp://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20010727/88091.html; Dou Shi Danbao Re de Huo; Dongshizhang BeiGudong Gaodao [A Disaster All Caused by a Guarantee; Chairman of the Board Brought Down by ShareholderSuit], JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORIAL DAILY], July 27, 2001, available athttp://www.chinalawinfo.com/fldt/xwnr.asp?id=2185.
company brought a doctrinally unsatisfactory result: while acknowledging the applicability of theSupreme People’s Court’s Reply in the Zhangjiagang Fiber Company Case, the court allowed themajority shareholder both to sue and to recover in its own name in the approved settlement; anotherminority (10%) shareholder received nothing.(3)  Xiamen Xinda Network Company CaseIn May 1997, the Xiamen Xinda Network Company (Network) was formed by three Chineseinvestors: Xiamen Xinda Company (Xinda), Century Manpower Company (Century I) and CenturyCommunications Company (Century II) (essentially the same party), and Hualun Company(Hualun).   Century I and Century II collectively had the power to appoint two directors; Xinda237could appoint two, and Hualun could appoint one.  After Century I and Century II refused to repaya loan from Network, the three non-Xinda directors rejected Xinda’s call for a meeting of the boardof directors to authorize action in pursuit of the debt.  Xinda then brought suit, naming asdefendants Century I and Century II as well as Network.Unlike many other cases, this case presents a clear victory for a derivative suit theory.  Notonly did the plaintiff win in the first instance, but the victory was upheld on appeal with a specificreference to that theory:If the infringement suffered by the shareholder is to the rights of the company, then the shareholder shouldfirst present a written application to the organ of power of the company requesting that the company takeaction or bring litigation against the party inflicting the harm and pursue its legal liability.  Where the companydoes not take any action, the shareholder may in its stead bring a lawsuit.238(4)  Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai Company CaseIn December 2000, Zhu Chuanlin entered into an agreement with the Jiaxing CommercialHolding Company (Holding) to purchase its 50% holding in the Wu Fang Zhai Company (Wu FangZhai), a joint stock company.   He later brought suit against Zhao Jianping, the chairman of Wu239Fang Zhai, alleging that Zhao had caused Wu Fang Zhai to guarantee the debt of a stockholder in
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    SPC Reply on Derivative Suits, supra note 233.240    The direct and indirect quotations from the court’s decision come from LUO PEIXIN, supra note241239, at 335.  I have been unable to find a copy of the court’s judgment.    Zhao had already been fined 100,000 yuan by the CSRC in related proceedings for various242transgressions.  The facts of this case are taken from Deng, supra note 217, at 371, Wu Hanqing,Gudong Daibiao Susong de Zai Sikao [Rethinking the Shareholder Representative Suit], GUANGDONG CAIJINGZHIYE XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF THE GUANGDONG VOCATIONAL ACADEMY OF FINANCEAND ECONOMICS], Vol. 2, No. 6 (Dec. 2003), at 83-86, and China Securities RegulatoryCommission, Xingzheng Chufa Jueding Shu (San Jiu Yi Yao ji Xiangguan Renyuan) [AdministrativePunishment Decision (San Jiu Pharmaceutical and Related Persons)], Zheng Jian Fa Zi (2002) No. 12, July 4,2002.  For more detail on the specific acts, see Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao &Oliver M. Rui, Is China's Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from Enforcement Actions, 24J. ACCOUNTING & PUBLIC POLICY 451, 481-82 (2005).    In order to avoid a formal decision that could be appealed, the court notified the plaintiff’s243lawyer solely through a telephone call.  See First Shareholder Suit, supra note 231.  This proceduremakes plausible the suspicion that the decision may have had less to do with the merits than with the local political clout of the company’s management.    2005 Company Law, supra note 34.244
violation of Article 147 of the Company Law, and that Wu Fang Zhai had been forced to pay thedebt—2.6 million yuan—after the stockholder defaulted.Ruling in Zhu’s favor, the court found that although the Company Law at that time had nospecific provisions allowing for shareholder derivative suits, “the principle is clear” from viewingArticles 63 and 111 together.  Moreover, it found that the 1994 Supreme People’s Court Reply in theZhangjiagang Fiber Company case  constituted a precedent.240 241(5)  San Jiu Pharmaceutical Company CaseNot all attempts at derivative suits were successful.  In April 2003, a shareholder ofShanghai-based San Jiu Pharmaceutical Company brought suit in Shenzhen’s Futian Basic-LevelPeople’s Court against Zhao Xinxian, a director of the company, for damages he had inflicted on thecompany through related-party transactions and through disclosure failures that had resulted in finesto the company of 500,000 yuan.   After the court rejected his suit, the shareholder refiled in the242same month in the name of the company in Shenzhen’s Intermediate People’s Court.  That court,however, refused to hear his suit on the grounds that the right to sue in the company’s namerequired the agreement—apparently unanimous—of all the shareholders.   Even requiring the243consent of the majority—precisely those who had been involved in the misappropriation—wouldhave made further prosecution of the suit impossible.  Still less could unanimous consent beachieved.c.  Derivative Suits in the New Company LawThe new Company Law,  adopted in October 2005 and effective as of January 1, 2006,244finally provides a sound statutory basis for derivative suits, albeit with certain limitations.  According
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    See Wu Yanfen, Lun Woguo Minshi Susong Feiyong Zhidu de Gaige yu Wanshan [On the Reform and245Perfection of the System of Civil Litigation Costs in China], GUANGXI XINGZHENG GUANLI GANBUXUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF THE GUANGXI ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT CADRECOLLEGE], No. 5, 2004, at 82, 84.    See, e.g., Liang Dingbang (Anthony Neoh), Cong Zhengquan Jianguan Jiaodu Kan Gongsi Fa Xiugai246[Viewing the Amendment of the Company Law from the Angle of Securities Supervision], in GUO & WANG,supra note 104, at 29-34; Jiang Ping, Gongsi Fa Cong 19 Shiji Dao 20 Shiji de Fazhan [The Development ofCompany Law from the 19th to the 20th Century], in GUO & WANG, supra note 104, at 21.    See generally Curtis Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory, and247Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 169 (2004).
to Article 152, shareholders holding 1% singly or collectively may, depending on the circumstances,make a demand on the board of directors or the board of supervisors to sue under Art. 150 of theCompany Law, which imposes liability for compensation on any director, supervisor, or seniormanager who causes losses to the company by violating “laws, administrative regulations, or thearticles of association during the course of performing his duties[.]” If the company does not bringsuit within thirty days, they may bring suit in their own name.It is too early to know how Article 152 will be implemented in practice.  As it offers verylittle by way of procedural guidance, a court not disposed to hear such cases will find a readyjustification for inaction.  Like the case law and quasi-legislative material preceding it, however,Article 152 appears to allow suits automatically provided only that shareholders satisfy certainprocedural requirements.  There is no apparent room for courts to consider an argument thatbringing suit would not be in the interests of the company.Even though derivative suits are now formally allowed, economic obstacles remain.  Whenthe recovery is to the company, the minority shareholder—who will benefit from the recovery onlyin proportion to his shareholding—has little incentive to bring suit unless he can recover his costsoff the top.  While Chinese law generally awards trial costs to the winner, such costs are usuallydefined only as funds paid to the court as filing and other fees, and do not include attorneys’ fees.245Other commentators have suggested the establishment of a foundation that would ownshares in every listed company.   Corporate governance litigation through similar non-profit246organizations has proved reasonably successful in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan;  whether the247model can be transplanted to a country in which the government keeps tight control over civilsociety institutions remains to be seen. V.  CONCLUSIONThis article has examined the institutional environment in China for corporate governanceinstitutions understood in a narrow sense: those that operate to mitigate both vertical and horizontalagency costs and attempt to align the interests of those who manage money with those who supplyit.  It has lessons for existing literature in the field of comparative corporate governance and in turntakes from lessons from it.First, this article bears on the LLSV literature that attempts to measure legal institutionsthrough law on the books, typically as embodied in statutes.  Although criticism of this literature for
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    See Pistor & Xu, supra note 6.248    See Pistor & Xu, supra note 21.249    See id.250
ignoring the law as it actually functions is not new, one contribution of this article is to showspecifically and in detail just how far and why, in one important jurisdiction, law on the books turnsout to be very hard to measure—which “books,” for example, does one actually observe?—and todiverge considerably from practice.  This is not to say that the task of measuring legal inputs andoutputs is entirely hopeless and cannot possibly yield valid results, but it is to suggest that themeasurement is extremely difficult, and must be done with far more sensitivity to local conditionsthan has been apparent so far.  That this will be costly and make it hard to accumulate data fordozens of countries is unfortunate, but no less true for being unfortunate.Second, it bears on, and takes lessons from, the literature on comparative institutionalchoice.  Pistor and Xu argue that administrative agencies are in principle suited to certain legal tasks,whereas other tasks are in principle best left to courts.   In their model, administrative agencies248engage in ex ante, comprehensive rule-making and rule enforcement, whereas courts engage in expost dispute settlement.  They argue that the criteria for selecting institutions (as betweenadministrative agencies and courts) should be the degree to which the law needs further elucidationand interpretation (which they call incompleteness), the ability to standardize potentially harmful orbeneficial actions such that an administrative agency could engage in ex ante enforcement, and thelevel of expected harm if a violation is not prevented (by ex ante action) or deterred (by the prospectof ex post action).  And they conclude that fiduciary duty obligations in particular are best assignedto courts for enforcement, since they cannot be standardized and yet at the same time have a lowpotential for severe harm, since they are by their nature limited to one company.249As Pistor and Xu acknowledge, however, allocating certain tasks to courts as called for bytheir model may be pointless if courts are ineffective because of corruption, lack of political power,or other reasons, and thus extensive institutional reform may first be required.   This caveat250certainly seems to apply to China.  To the extent the policy advice presupposes extensiveinstitutional reform, however, it loses its value as advice about incremental policy changes that canbe undertaken now on a platform of existing institutions.Thus, for all the attention it receives, the shareholder rights approach described in PartII—indeed, any approach that relies upon formal legal institutions—cannot be expected to form themainstay of an effective corporate governance regime.  The courts have neither the power nor theinclination to play a major role, and government agencies such as the CSRC do not have theresources to serve as a substitute.Nor does the ownership approach hold out much hope.  At present, dominant shareholdersseem either to abuse their control or to fail to exercise it entirely.  There are two possible ways inwhich these problems could be remedied.  The state could improve its internal management systemso that it became a more effective monitor in the companies it dominated.  Such a reform isimaginable, but fails to address the issue of abuse of control.  The control of abuses rests ultimately,like the shareholder rights approach, on legal institutions—and as argued above, legal institutions area weak reed on which to rely.
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    In the words of Ronald Gilson,251 the goal is not necessarily to seek the optimal governance institutions for existing industrial conditions.  Rather,reform of national governance systems should strive to assure that institutional structure facilitates prompt andlow-cost organizational responses to changes in industrial technology.Ronald J. Gilson, Path Dependence and Comparative Corporate Governance: Corporate Governance and EconomicEfficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 343 (1996).    See Paredes, supra note 20.252    See generally KOMESAR, supra note 6.253
Unfortunately, the best available substitute approach, that of market monitoring, isdisfavored by the state.  The Chinese state prefers direct regulation by government agencies first,and indirect regulation by private litigation in the state’s courts next.  Regulation by the uncontrolledinstitutions of the market comes a distant third, and indeed it is hard to find such institutions inChina.  The stock markets are creatures of the state and exist only upon its sufferance; securitiesfirms are established and owned by various governmental bodies; banks are either directly owned orelse highly controlled by governmental bodies; the financial press is subject to significant stateinfluence, both through ownership channels and through the state’s pervasive regulation of themedia. In a state with limited administrative resources, it would make sense to rely as far as possibleon the contributions of non-state actors.  But Chinese corporate governance institutions are tiltedtoward the legal because the government generally suspects the institutions of the market and civilsociety in general.  It wants rules, not incentive structures.  There is a strong emphasis on getting therules right, and an inadequate attention to institutions that could be flexible in creating and enforcingrules as the situation warranted.251Troy Paredes has cogently argued that market solutions to corporate governance problemsare inappropriate for developing countries, because they do not have the necessary second-orderinstitutions—lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, securities analysts, etc.—that are needed formarkets to function successfully.  Private ordering cannot be relied on because parties simply do nothave the training and experience to bargain toward efficient arrangements.  Therefore, corporate lawshould consist largely of mandatory, bright-line rules that are easily monitored and enforced, notvague standards and default rules.252What an examination of Chinese institutions shows, however, is the need for a comparativeinstitutional analysis of the type urged by Neil Komesar.   To be sure, civil society institutions of253the type that would promote market ordering in China are indeed weak.  But it does not follow thatinstitutions for state ordering can do the job any better.  The key issue is that of which types ofinstitutional reforms would yield the most bang for the buck.  The policy option of simply allowingcivil society institutions to do more is often overlooked in studies of corporate governance in otherjurisdictions for the simple reason that few other jurisdictions impose such strict controls.  But inthe case of China, this area offers a great deal of room for reform.
58Table 1: Administrative sanctions against lawyers by CSRCYear Nature of violation Sanction1993 Disclosure violations in IPO Warning1996 Disclosure violations in IPO Warning; fine; temporary suspension of license to dosecurities-related work1998 Disclosure violations in stockoffering Criticism1998 Disclosure violations in stockoffering Criticism1998 Disclosure violations in IPO Confiscation of unlawfully obtained income; temporarysuspension of license to do securities-related work1999 Disclosure violations in IPO Warning; confiscation of unlawfully obtained income1999 Disclosure violations in IPO Temporary suspension of firm's license to do securities-related work; confiscation of unlawfully obtained income;revocation of individual lawyer's license to do securities-related work1999 Disclosure violations in IPO Warning; confiscation of unlawfully obtained income;warnings and fines for individual lawyer(s) who signedopinion2000 Disclosure violations in IPO Warning; confiscation of unlawfully obtained income;warnings and fines for individual lawyer(s) who signedopinion2000 Disclosure violations in IPO Confiscation of unlawfully obtained income; fine of 250,000yuan; revocation of license to do securities-related work oflawyer(s) who signed opinion2000 Disclosure violations in IPO Warning to firm and individual lawyers2000 Disclosure violations in IPO Criticism of firm and individual lawyers2000 Incorrectly advised companythat CSRC approval not neededfor overseas IPO Warning; CSRC not to accept legal opinions from firm forsix months2000 Issued formal opinion letter tolisting firm before CSRCapproval Criticism; CSRC not to accept legal opinions from firm forsix monthsSource: Peng Bing, Zhengquan Lüshi Xingzheng Zeren de Shizheng Yanjiu [Empirical Research into the AdministrativeLiability of Securities Lawyers], FA SHANG YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW AND COMMERCE], no. 6, 2004, at 16;author's research.
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Table 3: CSRC punishment decisions satisfying SPC conditions for private litigation, 2002-2007Year Number of punishmentdecisions (chufa jueding)* Of which, number satisfyingSPC conditions2002 17 62003 34 142004 49 242005 43 132006 39 182007 (as of Feb. 23, 2008) 29 15Source: CSRC Web site, http://www.csrc.gov.cn; author’s analysis.
Table 2: Enforcement actions by regulators, 1998-2003Year Enforcement actions takenby regulatory agencies* Of whichpunishment Number of companies listed onShanghai and Shenzhen StockExchanges1998 3 3 8531999 12 9 9502000 16 7 10882001 71 9 11602002 62 8 12352003 51 11 1287Source: Pistor & Xu, supra note 203, at 33. “Regulatory agencies” includes the CSRC, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and other*government agencies with enforcement power.
